The terms social learning and social in£uence have been used descriptively and theoretically to characterize a broad range of animal behavior from physical antipredatory adaptations such as eye spots, which are totally under genetic control, to the human capacity for the exaggeration of individual characteristics, known as caricature, which are largely under cognitive control. In the present review, the various forms of social in£uence and social learning are identi¢ed and distinghished from imitation, a term that generally has been reserved for behavioral matching that cannot be accounted for using simpler speci¢cally predisposed, motivational, or learning mechanisms. It is suggested that much of the ambiguity in the literature concerning the various forms of social learning can be attributed to the distinction between the function of a behavior and the mechanisms responsible for its occurrence. Finally, the various mechanisms that have been proposed to account for imitative learning are presented and an attempt is made to evaluate them.When the term imitation is used by psychologists it typically implies more than the simple reproduction of behavior. In everyday language, imitation carries with it the implication of intentionality or purposiveness (see Mitchell, 1987). When humans use imitation to describe their own behavior, it implies that there is an understanding of the relation between that behavior and the behavior being modeled (or visually demonstrated). For example, when a child imitates the