Imagination and the motivational view of belief

O’Brien, Lucy

doi:10.1093/analys/65.1.55

Cited by 15 publications

(8 citation statements)

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“…It is unclear whether it is possible to do that but it seems pretty clear that this is not what we do in supposing or when we 'imagine that …' Thus it seems that if, in line with ordinary language, we still want to refer to such acts as instances of imagining, then at least we have to note this essential difference between them (O'Brien 2005). Belief is a mode in which we intend something, e.g., we can entertain a thought in the mode of belief, or doubt, or under the suspension of belief-we can perceive with belief (as we usually do), but we can also doubt what we perceive (when, for example, we are aware of a perceptual illusion).…”

Section: Imagination In Interdisciplinary Researchmentioning

confidence: 98%

Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science

Gallagher¹,

Schmicking²

2010

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Section: Imagination In Interdisciplinary Researchmentioning

confidence: 98%

Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science

Gallagher¹,

Schmicking²

2010

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“…Ichino 2015) (Glüer & Wikforss, , pp. 143–145; Noordhof, , p. 253; O'Brien, , p. 59). Examples include childhood pretense, checking in one's wardrobe for monsters after seeing a horror film, and so on.…”

Section: Biased By Our Imaginingsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Biased by our imaginings

Sullivan-Bissett

2018

Mind & Language

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I propose a new model of implicit bias, according to which implicit biases are constituted by unconscious imaginings. I argue that my model accommodates characteristic features of implicit bias, does not face the problems of the doxastic model, and is uniquely placed to accommodate the structural heterogeneity in the category of implicit bias. Finally I turn to how my view relates to holding people accountable for their biases and what we know about intervention strategies.

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“…11 11 Velleman's claim of sameness of motivational role of believing and imagining met with some criticism, e.g., O'Brien (2005), but, obviously, I am not concerned here with whether this claim is true. I am granting it for the sake of the argument. …”

mentioning

confidence: 95%

Conceptual Evidentialism

Nayding¹

2011

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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Two recent arguments purport to find a new and firmer foundation for evidentialism in the very nature of the concept of belief. Evidentialism is claimed to be a conceptual truth about belief, and pragmatism to be ruled out, conceptually. But can the conclusion of such conceptual arguments be regarded as the denial of pragmatism? The pragmatist traditionally conceived belief through its motivational role. Therefore, when confronted with conceptual evidentialism, the pragmatist should cede the term 'belief,' but insist that pragmatism be understood as a claim about another attitude, a motivational duplicate of belief. Thus, the original dispute is simply relocated terminologically.p apq_1386 39..65Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2011) 39-65

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Imagination and the motivational view of belief

Cited by 15 publications

References 0 publications

Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science

Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science

Biased by our imaginings

Conceptual Evidentialism

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