Conceptual Evidentialism

Nayding, Inga

doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.2010.01386.x

Cited by 8 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…Indeed, as they see it, the whole point of faith is to believe in the absence of evidence. (Some examples are described in Nayding ; see also Worsnip (ms). )…”

Section: Believing Without Evidencementioning

confidence: 99%

Believing for Practical Reasons

Rinard

2018

Nous

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Some prominent evidentialists argue that practical considerations cannot be normative reasons for belief because they can't be motivating reasons for belief. Existing pragmatist responses turn out to depend on the assumption that it's possible to believe in the absence of evidence. The evidentialist may deny this, at which point the debate ends in an impasse. I propose a new strategy for the pragmatist. This involves conceding that belief in the absence of evidence is impossible. We then argue that evidence can play a role in bringing about belief without being a motivating reason for belief, thereby leaving room for practical considerations to serve as motivating reasons. I present two ways in which this can happen. First, agents can use evidence as a mere means by which to believe, with practical considerations serving as motivating reasons for belief, just as we use tools (e.g. a brake pedal) as mere means by which to do something (e.g. slow down) which we are motivated to do for practical reasons. Second, evidence can make it possible for one to choose whether or not to believe – a choice one can then make for practical reasons. These arguments push the debate between the evidentialist and the pragmatist into new territory. It is no longer enough for an evidentialist to insist that belief is impossible without evidence. Even if this is right, the outcome of the debate remains unsettled. It will hang on the ability of the evidentialist to respond to the new pragmatist strategy presented here.

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“…Indeed, as they see it, the whole point of faith is to believe in the absence of evidence. (Some examples are described in Nayding ; see also Worsnip (ms). )…”

Section: Believing Without Evidencementioning

confidence: 99%

Believing for Practical Reasons

Rinard

2018

Nous

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“…For example, it is not uncommon for theists to cite as the basis for their religious beliefs that those beliefs give meaning to their lives. Inga Nayding () references specific instances of this. Also, recall the optimistic patient who believes she'll recover, and the confident athlete who believes she'll win, even though they realize that the evidence is equivocal.…”

Section: The Argument From the Basis Of Beliefmentioning

confidence: 99%

No Exception for Belief

Rinard

2015

Philos Phenomenol Research

114

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This paper defends a principle I call Equal Treatment, according to which the rationality of a belief is determined in precisely the same way as the rationality of any other state. For example, if wearing a raincoat is rational just in case doing so maximizes expected value, then believing some proposition P is rational just in case doing so maximizes expected value. This contrasts with the popular view that the rationality of belief is determined by evidential support. It also contrasts with the common idea that in the case of belief, there are two different incommensurable senses of rationality, one of which is distinctively epistemic. I present considerations that favor Equal Treatment over these two alternatives, reply to objections, and criticize some arguments for Evidentialism. I also show how Equal Treatment opens the door to a distinctive kind of response to skepticism.

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2019

A Companion to Atheism and Philosophy

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Conceptual Evidentialism

Cited by 8 publications

References 19 publications

Believing for Practical Reasons

Believing for Practical Reasons

No Exception for Belief

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