Illicit markets and violence: what is the relationship?

Andreas, Peter; Wallman, Joel

doi:10.1007/s10611-009-9200-6

Cited by 73 publications

(45 citation statements)

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“…Violence in illegally organized criminal markets is often deployed strategically to gain market share or solve contractual problems (Andreas and Wallman 2009). Such violence varies in terms of frequency and visibility, but overall, organized crime-related violence tends to exhibit higher levels of cruelty and brutality than ordinary crime (Durán-Martínez 2015).…”

Section: The Logic Of Organized Crimementioning

confidence: 99%

Electoral Accountability in the Midst of Criminal Violence: Evidence from Mexico

Ley

2017

Lat. Am. polit. soc.

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Rising levels of crime and insecurity affect the quality of life. A fundamental question for the prospects of democracy is whether voters, in hopes of reaching better solutions to conditions of prevailing insecurity, can hold their elected officials accountable for such situations. This article argues that electoral accountability amid criminal violence requires voters to be able to assign responsibility for crime, and that partisan alignment across levels of government facilitates this task. Recent Mexican elections are examined to test this argument. Relying on both aggregate electoral data and individual survey evidence, this study shows that voters hold politicians accountable for crime in the narrow circumstances of organized crimerelated violence and political alignment. This evidence not only provides additional caveats to issue voting models, but also opens new avenues of research on electoral accountability.

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Section: The Logic Of Organized Crimementioning

confidence: 99%

Electoral Accountability in the Midst of Criminal Violence: Evidence from Mexico

Ley

2017

Lat. Am. polit. soc.

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“…Still, it is safe to assert that, in general, illicit businesses utilize violence more readily than legal ones do (Andreas and Wallman 2009). The explanation requires little elaboration: actors in organized illegal enterprises lack recourse to legal remedies to rectify violations of business agreements and to protect against those who would impinge on their activities or prey on their proceeds.…”

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confidence: 99%

Understanding Mexico’s Drug Violence

Shirk

Wallman²

2015

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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127

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A dramatic increase in criminal violence in Mexico since 2007 has resulted in an estimated 60,000-70,000 ''additional'' homicides, often of an especially brutal form, related to drug trafficking and other organized-crime activities. This violence has been accompanied by a steep increase in rates of kidnapping and extortion and has targeted participants in the narcotics trade as well as government officials, journalists, and civil society activists. Despite the magnitude of the violence and enormous public concern about it, scholarly literature on this topic has been scant. This issue offers some of the most promising analyses conducted thus far on the trends in violence and their causes, focusing largely, though not exclusively, on the role Mexico's government has played in the business of illegal drugs and the violence that accompanies it. In this introduction, we discuss the challenge of deriving reliable statistics on drug-related violence, its spatial and temporal patterns, prevailing explanations, its relationship to organized crime in general, and differences between this violence and substate political violence. OverviewFollowing its 1910 revolution and the postrevolutionary political violence of the 1920s and 1930s, Mexico underwent a steady decline in violent crime, especially

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“…This is also the case in the few studies that analyze recent changes in domestic drug markets (Llorente and McDermott 2014). This article builds on literature that recognizes that drug markets do not necessarily generate violence (Andreas and Wallman 2009;Lessing 2012a;Osorio 2013;Reuter 1989;Rios 2012). It also builds on research on violence in drug markets in the United States.…”

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confidence: 99%

Drugs Around the Corner: Domestic Drug Markets and Violence in Colombia and Mexico

Durán‐Martínez

2015

Lat. Am. polit. soc.

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Over the past decade, drug consumption has increased in Colombia and Mexico, countries traditionally concerned with drug production and trafficking. Governments and observers have associated this growth with spikes in violence. Drawing on drug consumption surveys and fieldwork in four cities, this study argues that contrary to this perception, there is no automatic connection between domestic drug markets and violence. Violence depends on whether large drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs) control low-level street dealers and on whether those DTOs have a market monopoly at the local level. When dealers are independent, violence might be sporadic, but when DTOs control dealers, violence can explode (given competition between DTOs) or implode (if one organization holds a monopoly). Control over dealers provides DTOs not only income but also informants and armed muscle. This article also shows that domestic drug markets are not new, and have grown incrementally in the past two decades.

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Illicit markets and violence: what is the relationship?

Cited by 73 publications

References 0 publications

Electoral Accountability in the Midst of Criminal Violence: Evidence from Mexico

Electoral Accountability in the Midst of Criminal Violence: Evidence from Mexico

Understanding Mexico’s Drug Violence

Drugs Around the Corner: Domestic Drug Markets and Violence in Colombia and Mexico

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