Identity priming consistently affects perceptual fluency but only affects metamemory when primes are obvious.

Abstract

Perceptual fluency manipulations influence metamemory judgments, with more fluently perceived information judged as more memorable. However, it is not always clear whether this influence is driven by actual experienced processing fluency or by beliefs about memory. The current study used an identity-priming paradigm-in which words are preceded by either matched (identical) or mismatched primes-to examine the 2 influences. Participants named and made judgments of learning (JOLs) for critical words and then completed a memory test. In Experiment 1, we briefly presented the primes and found a priming effect on naming latencies but not on JOLs. In Experiment 2, we presented the primes for longer durations and, again, found an effect on naming in addition to an effect on JOLs. A mediation analysis revealed that naming latencies did not account for the prime-JOL relationship. This pattern of results demonstrated a manipulation of perceptual fluency that influenced JOLs only when belief-based information was readily available.

Generating lies produces lower memory predictions and higher memory performance than telling the truth: Evidence for a metacognitive illusion.

“…Experiment 4 provides more evidence for theory-based processes, as participants produced higher JOLs for truth than for lies, despite the lack of objective response latency differences. Third, participants can be directly asked about their beliefs through questionnaires without being exposed to the experimental materials (Besken, 2016;Koriat et al, 2004;Kornell et al, 2011;Mueller et al, 2014;Susser et al, 2016), make JOLs before they are exposed to the specific episode on an item-by-item basis (Mueller et al, 2014(Mueller et al, , 2016, or make global estimations about the predicted memory performance before the experiment begins (Frank & Kuhlmann, 2016). Experiment 5 showed the contribution of a priori beliefs to JOLs through the presentation of a scenario, in which participants had to predict their memory performance without exposure to the experiment, revealing higher memory predictions for truth trials than lie trials.…”

“…Perhaps, this finding can be explained by a priori beliefs about the effects of the lie-generation manipulation. Thus, Experiment 5 applied a straightforward, widely used method (Besken, 2016;Koriat et al, 2004;Kornell et al, 2011;Mueller et al, 2014;Susser et al, 2016) to measure the effects of a priori beliefs on memory predictions. Specifically, participants who have not been exposed to the study materials are asked to read a memory experiment scenario and make predictions about the effect of the lie-generation manipulation.…”

The effects of emotion on younger and older adults’ monitoring of learning

“…Thus, in the present context in which valence accounted for the impact of emotion on JOLs, it seems reasonable that younger and older adults based their JOLs on beliefs about how emotion influences their memory (cf. Jia et al, 2016; Mueller, Dunlosky, Tauber, & Rhodes, 2014; Mueller, Tauber, & Dunlosky, 2013; Susser, Jin, & Mulligan, 2016) rather than on processing experiences (akin to fluency) during study (cf. Hertzog, Dunlosky, Robinson, & Kidder, 2003; Kelley & Jacoby, 1996; Undorf & Erdfelder, 2011, 2013).…”

The limited use of the fluency heuristic: Converging evidence across different procedures

“…Objective fluency is defined as some measure of processing speed, like reaction times. In contrast, subjective fluency, and thus the basis of subsequent behavior, may not only depend on the perceived ease of processing (as captured by objective measures), but also on additional factors, like the expected fluency, metacognitions, and attributional processes (see, e.g., Susser, Jin, & Mulligan, 2016, on metamnemonic beliefs). For example, participants may well differentiate whether experienced fluency stems from the retrieved object itself, or rather from some external source, the so-called context (previous encounters, perceptual conditions, etc.…”

“…In addition to the metamnemonic and attributional processes discussed above (see also Susser et al, 2016), the process of recognition may be composed of several subprocesses, some or all of which contribute more or less to subjectively experienced fluency (Reber et al, 2004). Thus, there are several options for how to operationalize objective fluency: For example, Benjamin, Bjork, and Schwartz (1998) used answer retrieval latencies; Reber et al (2004), identification latencies; Schooler and Hertwig (2005), recognition latencies; Mueller, Dunlosky, Tauber, and Rhodes (2014), lexical decision latencies; Susser et al (2016), naming latencies; and Undorf and Erdfelder (2015), the numbers of trials to acquisition and self-paced study times (see also Koriat, 2008). This diversity of measures led Reber et al (2004, p. 50) to claim that "there seemingly is no single objective fluency."…”