Generating lies produces lower memory predictions and higher memory performance than telling the truth: Evidence for a metacognitive illusion.

Abstract

Manipulations that induce disfluency during encoding generally produce lower memory predictions for the disfluent condition than for the fluent condition. Similar to other manipulations of disfluency, generating lies takes longer and requires more mental effort than does telling the truth; hence, a manipulation of lie generation might produce patterns similar to other types of fluency for memory predictions. The current study systematically investigates the effect of a lie-generation manipulation on both actual and predicted memory performance. In a series of experiments, participants told the truth or generated plausible lies to general knowledge questions and made item-by-item predictions about their subsequent memory performance during encoding, followed by a free recall test. Participants consistently predicted their memory performance to be higher for truth than for lies (Experiments 1 through 4), despite their typically superior actual memory performance for lies than for the truth (Experiments 1 through 3), producing double dissociations between memory and metamemory. Moreover, lying led to longer response latencies than did telling the truth, showing that generating lies is in fact objectively more disfluent. An additional experiment compared memory predictions for truth and lie trials via a scenario about the lie-generation manipulation used in the present study, which revealed superior memory predictions of truth than of lies, providing proof for a priori beliefs about the effects of lying on predicted memory (Experiment 5). The effects of the current lie-generation manipulation on metamemory are discussed in light of experience-based and theory-based processes on making judgments of learning. Theoretical and practical implications of this experimental paradigm are also considered. (PsycINFO Database Record

Beliefs about memory decline in aging do not impact judgments of learning (JOLs): A challenge for belief-based explanations of JOLs

“…Recent research has established that people's beliefs about the impact of a cue can influence their JOLs (e.g., Hu et al, 2015;Jia et al, 2016;Mueller & Dunlosky, 2017;Mueller, Dunlosky, & Tauber, 2016;Mueller, Dunlosky, Tauber, & Rhodes, 2014;Mueller, Tauber, & Dunlosky, 2013;Susser, Jin, & Mulligan, 2016;Undorf & Zimdahl, 2019;Witherby & Tauber, 2017). One way that this contribution of memory beliefs has been evaluated is with questionnaires probing for people's beliefs about their memory (Besken, 2016;Jia et al, 2016;Koriat, Bjork, Sheffer, & Bar, 2004;Kornell, Rhodes, Castel, & Tauber, 2011;Li et al, 2017;Mueller et al, 2016;Mueller, Dunlosky, Tauber, & Rhodes, 2014;Mueller et al, 2013;Price, McElroy, & Martin, 2016;Witherby & Tauber, 2017, 2018.…”

Blessedly forgetful and blissfully unaware: a positivity bias in memory for (re)constructions of imagined past and future events

“…The experiment closest to the current study in design, Gerlach et al ( 2014) Experiment 1, used 24 adults per group. Other studies that investigate JOLs for processing fluency (e.g., Besken, 2018;Mueller et al, 2013) or emotions (e.g., Hourihan & Bursey, 2017) usually use sample sizes ranging from 20 to 40 per group. A statistical power analysis through G-power (Faul et al, 2009) revealed that a sample size of 30 was necessary to detect a middle-sized effect of f = .25 with a power of .90, at an alpha of .05.…”

“…In addition to memory, the present study also investigates the effects of imagination of past and future hypothetical events on metamemory, which refers to people's beliefs and predictions about how their memory operates. Although there are studies showing that people can accurately predict their subsequent memory performance (Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991), other studies show that under certain circumstances there might be mismatches between people's memory predictions and actual memory performance (Benjamin et al, 1998;Besken, 2016Besken, , 2018Besken & Mulligan, 2013;Yue et al, 2013). Emotional valence is one factor that sometimes causes a mismatch between predicted and actual memory performance.…”

“…If we were to evaluate the difficulty level of cognitive tasks and place them on a spectrum from effortless to very effortful, this, in turn, would place the metacognitive experiences on a spectrum from very fluent to disfluent, respectively (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009). The studies utilising metacognitive judgments of learning (JOLs), the predictions people give about the likelihood of remembering an item in a later memory test, typically show that participants tend to give higher JOL ratings to easily or fluently processed items, (Benjamin et al, 1998;Besken, 2016Besken, , 2018Besken & Mulligan, 2013;Koriat & Ma'ayan, 2005;Rhodes & Castel, 2008Yue et al, 2013), even though the actual memory performance may not always match with these metacognitive predictions. In line with this, it is possible that imagining a possible future and past event might also be affected by the fluency of these processes.…”

Lying and memory in forensic interviews: The influence of voluntary deception and repeated interviews on memory for the truth

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