Beliefs about memory decline in aging do not impact judgments of learning (JOLs): A challenge for belief-based explanations of JOLs

Tauber, Sarah K.; Witherby, Amber E.; Dunlosky, John

doi:10.3758/s13421-019-00919-3

Cited by 17 publications

(31 citation statements)

References 50 publications

(86 reference statements)

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“…Koriat’s (1997) dual-basis view of metacognitive ratings delineates between experience-based cues and theory-based cues. Experience-based cues refer to cues used to make JOLs that are drawn from the actual experience of solving or memorizing an item, e.g., “How quickly did I solve that problem?” Information-based cues, on the other hand, refer to cues that are drawn from pre-existing beliefs about one’s competence, e.g., “Do I have a very good memory?” Metacognitive monitoring within memory tasks tends to rely on experience-based cues such as ease of processing or retrieval fluency (Begg et al, 1989; Benjamin et al, 1998; Tauber et al, 2019). However, when asked to provide a metacognitive rating, participants will draw on whatever cues are salient.…”

Section: Theoretical Framework Of Reactivitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Reactivity to Measures of Metacognition

Double

Birney

2019

Front. Psychol.

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Metacognition is typically measured by collecting self-reported information from participants while they complete a cognitive task. Recent evidence suggests that eliciting such metacognitive information from participants can impact both their metacognitive processes and their cognitive performance. Although there are contradictory findings regarding the magnitude and even the direction of this effect, recent evidence has converged to provide a clearer picture of the mechanisms that determine reactivity. Here, we provide a review of the evidence that measures of metacognition, namely think-aloud protocols, judgments of learning, and confidence ratings, are reactive. We argue that reactivity has important implications not just for the measurement of metacognition, but for metacognition theorizing because reactivity can provide insights into the cues participants use to monitor their performance. Drawing from this synthesis of evidence, we propose a tentative framework for studying reactivity that integrates cue processing accounts of reactivity with existing models of metacognition. We conclude the review by addressing some of the pertinent questions yet to be comprehensively addressed by reactivity research, including how researchers should best address issues of reactivity when using experimental designs.

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Section: Theoretical Framework Of Reactivitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Reactivity to Measures of Metacognition

Double

Birney

2019

Front. Psychol.

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“…Based on findings in previous studies, we conclude that there is a need for more evidence how feedback affects students' metacognitive skills during formative assessments with SRS (Brady et al, 2013;Jones et al, 2012). Previous literature has indicated, for example, that students judge their state of learning during formative assessments based on the number of available cues that may be predictive of subsequent performance (Pyc, Rawson & Aschenbrenner, 2014;Tauber, Witherby & Dunlosky, 2019).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 75%

Using digital formative assessments to improve learning in physics education

Molin

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“…Even so, little is known about how person-centered cues such as mood impact monitoring judgments, and there is some evidence that these broader cues do not impact JOLs even when participants have beliefs about them (cf. Tauber et al, 2019). Thus, participants may not demonstrate mood-congruent judgments.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

People hold mood-congruent beliefs about memory but do not use these beliefs when monitoring their learning.

Witherby¹,

Tauber²,

Goodrich³

2022

Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cogni

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Contemporary theories of metacognitive monitoring propose that beliefs play a critical role in monitoring of learning. Even so, recent evidence suggests that beliefs are not always sufficient to impact people’s monitoring. In seven experiments, we explored people’s beliefs about the impact of mood and item valence on memory and whether people use their beliefs about these cues when monitoring their learning. Participants expressed mood-congruent beliefs (Experiments 1, 6, and 7). That is, they believed people in a negative mood would remember more negative items than positive and neutral items. To evaluate whether they use this belief when monitoring their learning, participants studied emotional (positive and negative) and neutral pictures (Experiments 2 and 3) or words (Experiments 4, 5, and 7), made a judgment of learning (JOL) for each, and completed a free-recall test. In Experiments 2–5, participants completed the learning task while in a negative or neutral mood. The negative mood was induced with an established mood induction procedure. In contrast to the belief-based hypothesis, participants did not make mood-congruent JOLs; JOLs were not influenced by mood. By contrast, JOLs were consistently higher for emotional relative to neutral items. Thus, although participants demonstrated a mood-congruent belief, they did not use this belief when monitoring their learning. These outcomes demonstrate that simply having a belief about a person-centered cue (e.g., a belief about the impact of a person’s mood on memory) is not sufficient for that belief to impact monitoring of learning.

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Beliefs about memory decline in aging do not impact judgments of learning (JOLs): A challenge for belief-based explanations of JOLs

Cited by 17 publications

References 50 publications

Reactivity to Measures of Metacognition

Reactivity to Measures of Metacognition

Using digital formative assessments to improve learning in physics education

People hold mood-congruent beliefs about memory but do not use these beliefs when monitoring their learning.

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