Ideational apraxia: A deficit in tool selection and use

Ochipa, Cynthia; Rothi, Leslie J. Gonzalez; Heilman, Kenneth M.

doi:10.1002/ana.410250214

Cited by 220 publications

(116 citation statements)

References 9 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

105

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…In concordance with this, we have reported a group of patients with ideomotor apraxia owing to corticobasal degeneration,who had difficulties demonstrating the use of real objects (Spatt et al, 2002). Ochipa, Rothi, and Heilman (1989) reported a lefthanded patient who, following a right-hemisphere stroke, was able to name objects but was unable to point to them when their functions were described or to describe their functions himself. Furthermore, he was unable to demonstrate their uses.…”

Section: Impaired Object Use In the Context Of Preserved Semantic Knosupporting

confidence: 58%

When objects lose their meaning: What happens to their use?

Bozeat

Ralph

Patterson

et al. 2002

Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience

156

143

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The 8 patients involved in this study were impaired on tests assessing knowledge of objects and on the demonstration of their use. The patients' success in object use was significantly correlated with their knowledge about the objects, providing further evidence that conceptual knowledge plays a key role in object use. Having a recipient present improved performance in the moderately impaired patients, suggesting that a certain level of conceptual knowledge must remain for the additional information to be beneficial. Although overall accuracy in using the target objects was not related to our measures of affordance, the specific aspects of use afforded by the objects' structures were relatively impervious to semantic impairment, suggesting a role for affordance information when object-specific knowledge is disrupted. The patients' familiarity with the objects was an important predictor of performance. Finally, despite good performance on tests of mechanical problem solving, the patients showed very little evidence of employing these skills in their interactions with real objects.

show abstract

Section: Impaired Object Use In the Context Of Preserved Semantic Knosupporting

confidence: 58%

When objects lose their meaning: What happens to their use?

Bozeat

Ralph

Patterson

et al. 2002

Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience

156

143

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…In other words, his original definition had two parts: a deficit of chaining motor elements in the proper order to create purposeful movements and a deficit in demonstrating what an object, that is, a tool, is used for. Contemporary clinical studies have shifted attention away from ideational apraxia in terms of chaining errors and focused almost entirely on errors in understanding how to use or choose tools to accomplish a task, also referred to as conceptual apraxia, creating a confusing semiology (Ochipa, Rothi, & Heilman, 1989). With few exceptions (Poeck, 1983), little clinical progress has been made in identifying patients with isolated disorders in the chaining of motor elements to create purposeful movements, in part because of the rarity of this deficit as an isolated lesion.…”

Section: Ideational Apraxiamentioning

confidence: 99%

Evidence for a distributed hierarchy of action representation in the brain

Grafton

Hamilton

2007

Human Movement Science

431

359

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Complex human behavior is organized around temporally distal outcomes. Behavioral studies based on tasks such as normal prehension, multi-step object use and imitation establish the existence of relative hierarchies of motor control. The retrieval errors in apraxia also support the notion of a hierarchical model for representing action in the brain. In this review, three functional brain imaging studies of action observation using the method of repetition suppression are used to identify a putative neural architecture that supports action understanding at the level of kinematics, object centered goals and ultimately, motor outcomes. These results, based on observation, may match a similar functional anatomic hierarchy for action planning and execution. If this is true, then the findings support a functional anatomic model that is distributed across a set of interconnected brain areas that are differentially recruited for different aspects of goal oriented behavior, rather than a homogeneous mirror neuron system for organizing and understanding all behavior.

show abstract

“…It was claimed that ideational apraxia reflects an impairment of the praxis conceptual system including loss of knowledge related to tools [De Renzi and Lucchelli, 1988], but others argued that the term must be restricted to action sequencing disorders [Poeck, 1983]. Subsequently, Ochipa et al [1989] proposed the term conceptual apraxia to qualify disturbances of the action semantic system except action-sequencing disorders. Conceptual apraxia was reported in patients suffering from Alzheimer's disease [Dumont and Ska, 2000;Foundas et al, 1999;Greenwald et al, 1992;Ochipa et al, 1992;Schwartz et al, 2000] in which the temporal cerebral structures are often early damaged.…”

Section: Action Semantic Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Imaging a cognitive model of apraxia: The neural substrate of gesture‐specific cognitive processes

Peigneux

Linden

Garraux

et al. 2004

Human Brain Mapping

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract:The present study aimed to ascertain the neuroanatomical basis of an influential neuropsychological model for upper limb apraxia [Rothi LJ, et al. The Neuropsychology of Action. 1997. Hove, UK: Psychology Press]. Regional cerebral blood flow was measured in healthy volunteers using H 2 15O PET during performance of four tasks commonly used for testing upper limb apraxia, i.e., pantomime of familiar gestures on verbal command, imitation of familiar gestures, imitation of novel gestures, and an action-semantic task that consisted in matching objects for functional use. We also re-analysed data from a previous PET study in which we investigated the neural basis of the visual analysis of gestures. First, we found that two sets of discrete brain areas are predominantly engaged in the imitation of familiar and novel gestures, respectively. Segregated brain activation for novel gesture imitation concur with neuropsychological reports to support the hypothesis that knowledge about the organization of the human body mediates the transition from visual perception to motor execution when imitating novel gestures [Goldenberg Neuropsychologia 1995;33:63-72]. Second, conjunction analyses revealed distinctive neural bases for most of the gesture-specific cognitive processes proposed in this cognitive model of upper limb apraxia. However, a functional analysis of brain imaging data suggested that one single memory store may be used for "to-be-perceived" and "to-be-produced" gestural representations, departing from Rothi et al.'s proposal. Based on the above considerations, we suggest and discuss a revised model for upper limb apraxia that might best account for both brain imaging findings and neuropsychological dissociations reported in the apraxia literature.

show abstract

Ideational apraxia: A deficit in tool selection and use

Cited by 220 publications

References 9 publications

When objects lose their meaning: What happens to their use?

When objects lose their meaning: What happens to their use?

Evidence for a distributed hierarchy of action representation in the brain

Imaging a cognitive model of apraxia: The neural substrate of gesture‐specific cognitive processes

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About