Evidence for a distributed hierarchy of action representation in the brain

Grafton, Scott T.; Hamilton, Antonia F. de C.

doi:10.1016/j.humov.2007.05.009

Cited by 431 publications

(413 citation statements)

References 144 publications

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“…Thus, even the very earliest evidence for goal-based action processing suggests representations more abstract than those assumed by dominant motor resonance theories. Others have adopted a broader definition of "motor" simulation that includes representations abstracted away from the kinematic properties of actions, encompassing functional or causal information about how physical movements generate effects on the environment (47,48). These accounts are broadly consistent with the perspective provided here in that they aim to explain how top-down constraints enable the identification of abstract goals from visual representations of kinematics.…”

Section: Relation To Motor Theoriesmentioning

confidence: 70%

First-person action experience reveals sensitivity to action efficiency in prereaching infants

Skerry

Carey

Spelke

2013

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

143

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Do infants learn to interpret others' actions through their own experience producing goal-directed action, or does some knowledge of others' actions precede first-person experience? Several studies report that motor experience enhances action understanding, but the nature of this effect is not well understood. The present research investigates what is learned during early motoric production, and it tests whether knowledge of goal-directed actions, including an assumption that actors maximize efficiency given environmental constraints, exists before experience producing such actions. Three-month-old infants (who cannot yet effectively reach for and grasp objects) were given novel experience retrieving objects that rested on a surface with no barriers. They were then shown an actor reaching for an object over a barrier and tested for sensitivity to the efficiency of the action. These infants showed heightened attention when the agent reached inefficiently for a goal object; in contrast, infants who lacked successful reaching experience did not differentiate between direct and indirect reaches. Given that the infants could reach directly for objects during training and were given no opportunity to update their actions based on environmental constraints, the training experience itself is unlikely to have provided a basis for learning about action efficiency. We suggest that infants apply a general assumption of efficient action as soon as they have sufficient information (possibly derived from their own action experience) to identify an agent's goal in a given instance.A hallmark of goal-directed action is its flexibility (1). Intelligent agents draw on causal and functional knowledge to update their action plans based on the constraints and affordances of the current environment. As a result, the same goal can be achieved with various means depending on the situation, and the same movements can reflect diverse goals. This flexibility poses a nontrivial inference problem for the outside observer seeking to uncover agents' intentions and predict their future behavior.Humans nonetheless make sense of others' behavior, and do so by recruiting a "theory of mind" that relates observable actions to subjective mental states (2). This intuitive theory relies on a key assumption that agents are rational, pursuing their goals with the most efficient means possible in a given context (3, 4). By assuming that agents pursue their goals efficiently, an observer can flexibly adapt expectations about others' actions to the constraints of a given situation, and can interpret the same actions differently based on the context. This efficiency assumption thus constrains an otherwise underdetermined inference problem, providing a flexible schema for explaining and predicting action.The Origins of Rational Action Knowledge Studies with human infants suggest that this efficiency assumption is in place by the second half of the first year. When shown visual displays of an agent passing over an obstacle to approach a goal object, infants ex...

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Section: Relation To Motor Theoriesmentioning

confidence: 70%

First-person action experience reveals sensitivity to action efficiency in prereaching infants

Skerry

Carey

Spelke

2013

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

143

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“…This does not mean that agents cannot learn about their motor plant. Indeed, the motor plant is probably one of the most important aspects of the environment for predicting sensory input (see Grafton and Hamilton 2007). This may be reflected in the preoccupation of infants with moving their limbs (and the role of rattles in promoting multimodal learning).…”

Section: Forward Models In Motor Controlmentioning

confidence: 99%

Action and behavior: a free-energy formulation

et al. 2010

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We have previously tried to explain perceptual inference and learning under a free-energy principle that pursues Helmholtz's agenda to understand the brain in terms of energy minimization. It is fairly easy to show that making inferences about the causes of sensory data can be cast as the minimization of a free-energy bound on the likelihood of sensory inputs, given an internal model of how they were caused. In this article, we consider what would happen if the data themselves were sampled to minimize this bound. It transpires that the ensuing active sampling or inference is mandated by ergodic arguments based on the very existence of adaptive agents. Furthermore, it accounts for many aspects of motor behavior; from retinal stabilization to goal-seeking. In particular, it suggests that motor control can be understood as fulfilling prior expectations about proprioceptiveThe free-energy principle is an attempt to explain the structure and function of the brain, starting from the fact that we exist: This fact places constraints on our interactions with the world, which have been studied for years in evolutionary biology and systems theory. However, recent advances in statistical physics and machine learning point to a simple scheme that enables biological systems to comply with these constraints. If one looks at the brain as implementing this scheme (minimizing a free-energy bound on disorder), then many aspects of its anatomy and physiology start to make sense. In this article, we show that free-energy can be reduced by selectively sampling sensory inputs. This leads to adaptive responses and provides a new view of how movement control might work in the brain. The main conclusion is that we only need to have expectations about the sensory consequences of moving in order to elicit movement. This means we that can replace the notion of desired movements with expected movements and understand action in terms of perceptual expectations.The Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, 12 Queen Square, London, WC1N 3BG, sensations. This formulation can explain why adaptive behavior emerges in biological agents and suggests a simple alternative to optimal control theory. We illustrate these points using simulations of oculomotor control and then apply to same principles to cued and goal-directed movements. In short, the free-energy formulation may provide an alternative perspective on the motor control that places it in an intimate relationship with perception.

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“…These specialized neurons have prompted researchers to propose that action perception and production processes form a bidirectional, interactive loop within the primate brain. Since the discovery of mirror neurons in monkeys, many studies have investigated similar functional regions within the human brain, providing evidence for a human action observation network (AON; see Grafton and Hamilton 2007). In addition to the premotor cortex and the inferior parietal lobule (the core mirror system regions discovered in non-human primates; Rizzolatti and Craighero 2004), the action observation network includes the superior temporal sulcus, a region involved in biological motion processing (Blake and Shiffrar 2007), as well as the supplemental motor area, a region implicated in action sequencing and planning (Cross et al 2009a;Grèzes and Decety 2001).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Neuroaesthetics and beyond: new horizons in applying the science of the brain to the art of dance

Cross

Ticini

2011

Phenom Cogn Sci

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Throughout history, dance has maintained a critical presence across all human cultures, defying barriers of class, race, and status. How dance has synergistically co-evolved with humans has fueled a rich debate on the function of art and the essence of aesthetic experience, engaging numerous artists, historians, philosophers, and scientists. While dance shares many features with other art forms, one attribute unique to dance is that it is most commonly expressed with the human body. Because of this, social scientists and neuroscientists are turning to dance and dancers to help answer questions of how the brain coordinates the body to perform complex, precise, and beautiful movements. In the present paper, we discuss how recent advances in neuroscientific methods provide the tools to advance our understanding of not only the cerebral phenomena associated with dance learning and observation but also the neural underpinnings of aesthetic appreciation associated with watching dance. We suggest that future work within the fields of dance neuroscience and neuroaesthetics have the potential to provide mutual benefits to both the scientific and artistic communities.

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Evidence for a distributed hierarchy of action representation in the brain

Cited by 431 publications

References 144 publications

First-person action experience reveals sensitivity to action efficiency in prereaching infants

First-person action experience reveals sensitivity to action efficiency in prereaching infants

Action and behavior: a free-energy formulation

Neuroaesthetics and beyond: new horizons in applying the science of the brain to the art of dance

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