Russkiias the NewRossiiskii? Nation-Building in Russia After 1991

Abstract

Russia’s post-1991 nation-building project has been torn between competing interpretations of national identity. Whereas the other former Soviet republics opted for nation-building centered on the titular nation, Russia’s approach to national identity was framed by the fact that the RSFSR had been defined not as a designated national homeland but as a multi-ethnic federation. This, coupled with Russia’s definition as the legal successor of the Soviet Union, suggesting continuity and a history of uninterrupted statehood, has enabled a range of rivaling understandings of how to define the “nation.” Focusing on top-down official nation-building, this article examines how, against a backdrop of shifting political contexts, structural constraints, and popular attitudes, the Kremlin has gradually revised its understanding of what constitutes the “Russian nation.” Four models for post-Soviet Russian nation-building are identified – the ethnic, the multi-national, the civic, and the imperial. Over time, the correlation of forces among these has shifted. The article concludes that, despite some claims of an ethno-nationalist turn after 2014, the Kremlin still employs nationalism instrumentally: National identity has undoubtedly become more russkii-centered, but, at the same time, the Kremlin keeps the definition of “Russianness” intentionally vague, blurring the boundaries between “nation” and “civilization.”

The Securitised ‘Others’ of Russian Nationalism in Ukraine and Russia

“…Both from a top-down elite perspective and bottom-up societal approach, scholars remark on how belonging to the Russian nation is imagined and mythologised, such as via multi-ethnic discourses, and how this demonstrates its civilizational components [12,13]. However, Blakkisrud argues that while Russian nationalism might appear civilisational, it is still ethnic in content [14]. For example, while civilisational rhetoric is frequently anchored in ethnocultural terms and appeals, as the Russian regime's rhetoric towards Crimea (e.g., 'KrymNash' / 'Crimea is ours') demonstrates [14].…”

“…However, Blakkisrud argues that while Russian nationalism might appear civilisational, it is still ethnic in content [14]. For example, while civilisational rhetoric is frequently anchored in ethnocultural terms and appeals, as the Russian regime's rhetoric towards Crimea (e.g., 'KrymNash' / 'Crimea is ours') demonstrates [14].…”

“…As Blakkisrud [14] and Aksiumov and Avksentev [16] identify, the problem is that neither civic/ethnic nor nation/empire dichotomies work for understanding Russian nationalism. The contemporary Russian Federation is an heir both to the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire, while other post-Soviet states are not.…”

“…The contemporary Russian Federation is an heir both to the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire, while other post-Soviet states are not. Rather these scholars dissect Russian nationalism into its different civic, multicultural, imperial, and civilisational components [16], and in terms of whether Russian nationalism is oriented towards the status quo or revision of borders, and state-centred or ethnically focused [14].…”

Innledning. Fokus: Krigen og forskningen

“…Hans München-tale fra 2007 trekkes også ofte frem som et symbol på et tidsskille der sporene til dagens politikk legges. Utviklingen av en stadig mer nasjonalistisk retorikk i Kreml peker i samme retning (Blakkisrud, 2022).…”