<i>Rationalism and Necessitarianism</i>

Lin, Martin

doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2011.00832.x

Cited by 24 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…This notion of relative possibility resembles the notion of per se possibility that Adams () and Lin () both attribute to Leibniz (at least during some points of his career). On this view, ‘a substance is necessarily F just in case it is essentially F .…”

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confidence: 67%

“…But perhaps other notions do not pass this test. For example, Lin () argues that metaphysical possibility is constitutively tied to counterfactuals in roughly speaking the following sense: if it makes sense to reason about what would be the case if P, then P is metaphysically possible. His idea is that this is not just a piece of theory but a platitude used to fix the referent of ‘metaphysical possibility’.…”

Section: The Role Of Contingencymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…I take it that this is (in roughest outline) Spinoza's idea in the Ethics , 1p29: 'In nature there is nothing contingent, but all things, from the necessity of the divine nature, have been determined to exist and act in a certain way.' At any rate, this is how Lin () interprets this passage.…”

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confidence: 91%

“…Two notable exceptions include Della Rocca () and (), and Pruss (), who have each argued for rationalism recently. Lin () and (forthcoming) discusses rationalism in some detail and defends it from an important objection, though I do not know whether he ultimately endorses the view.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…On this view, ‘a substance is necessarily F just in case it is essentially F . A substance is possibly F just in case it is not essentially not‐ F ’ (Lin (), p. 427). This allows Leibniz to say that it is possible in this per se sense that I do not exist, even though in another sense (the “ per accidens ” sense) I had to exist by virtue of the fact that God had to choose our world (it being the best of all possible worlds).…”

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Metaphysical Rationalism

Dasgupta

2014

Nous

150

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The Principle of Sufficient Reason states that everything has an explanation. But different notions of explanation yield different versions of this principle. Here a version is formulated in terms of the notion of a "grounding" explanation. Its consequences are then explored, with particular emphasis on the fact that it implies necessitarianism, the view that every truth is necessarily true. Finally, the principle is defended from a number of objections, including objections to necessitarianism. The result is a defense of a "rationalist" metaphysics, one that constitutes an alternative to the contemporary dogmas that some aspects of the world are "metaphysically brute" and that the world could in so many ways have been different.Those who are ignorant of true causes, make complete confusion-think that trees might talk just as well as men-that men might be formed from stones as well as from seed . . .-B. Spinoza, Ethics, 1p8s2A metaphysical rationalist is someone who endorses the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR), the principle that everything has an explanation. The PSR can be understood in a number of different ways depending on the meaning of 'explanation' and the range of the quantifier 'everything', so metaphysical rationalists come in many different stripes. But every rationalist thinks that in some interesting sense there is an explanation (or "reason") for everything. Her rationalism is then qualified as being metaphysical to distinguish it from other rationalisms (such as epistemic rationalism, a thesis concerning the sources of justification) but this qualification can now be dropped for brevity.Although rationalism of one form or another was arguably embraced by such luminaries as Aquinas, Spinoza, and Leibniz (amongst others), it is fair to say that it has since largely fallen out of favor. Indeed my sense is that (with a few exceptions) contemporary philosophers tend to treat it as an antiquated view that need not be taken seriously today. 1 This may be the result of two factors. First, the PSR (in one form or another) is often thought to have consequences that might be thought problematic, including necessitarianism (the view that every truth is necessarily true), the existence of God, and indeed the existence of every conceivable being. 2 And second, there is a perceived lack of evidence in its favor. These two factors naturally lead to an attitude of (perhaps respectful) dismissal. C 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

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confidence: 67%

Section: The Role Of Contingencymentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 91%

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confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

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Metaphysical Rationalism

Dasgupta

2014

Nous

150

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Leibniz and Spinoza on Plenitude and Necessity

Anfray¹

2021

A Companion to Spinoza

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Modal inferences in science: a tale of two epistemologies

2021

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Recent epistemology of modality has seen a growing trend towards metaphysics-first approaches. Contrastingly, this paper offers a more philosophically modest account of justifying modal claims, focusing on the practices of scientific modal inferences. Two ways of making such inferences are identified and analyzed: actualist-manipulationist modality (AM) and relative modality (RM). In AM, what is observed to be or not to be the case in actuality or under manipulations, allows us to make modal inferences. AM-based inferences are fallible, but the same holds for practically all empirical inquiry. In RM, modal inferences are evaluated relative to what is kept fixed in a system, like a theory or a model. RM-based inferences are more certain but framework-dependent. While elements from both AM and RM can be found in some existing accounts of modality, it is worth highlighting them in their own right and isolating their features for closer scrutiny. This helps to establish their relevant epistemologies that are free from some strong philosophical assumptions often attached to them in the literature. We close by showing how combining these two routes amounts to a view that accounts for a rich variety of modal inferences in science.

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Rationalism and Necessitarianism

Cited by 24 publications

References 3 publications

Metaphysical Rationalism

Metaphysical Rationalism

Leibniz and Spinoza on Plenitude and Necessity

Modal inferences in science: a tale of two epistemologies

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