Quid pro Quo: Political Trust and Policy Implementation inGreece during the Age of Austerity

Abstract

Why do national governments fail to implement deep reforms in light of strong international and European pressures? Building on the top‐down implementation framework by Mazmanian and Sabatier, we argue that political trust underpins the government's implementation track record. We investigate this argument by looking at the failure of the Greek government to implement bailout reforms between 2010 and 2012 in two areas: tax and duty collection and liberalization of taxi licenses. Lower levels of trust decrease administrative capacity and widen problem intractability, creating a vicious cycle of noncooperation and economic recession. Our findings have policy implications for administrative reforms and offer amendments to theories of implementation and institutional rational choice. Related Articles Related Media European Commission. . “Financial Assistance to Greece.” http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/assistance_eu_ms/greek_loan_facility/

How Do Credit Rating Agencies Rate? An Implementation Perspective on the Assessment of Austerity Programs during the European Debt Crisis

“…Like Exadaktylos and Zahariadis () in their recent study on bailout reforms in Greece, we draw on Sabatier and Mazmanian's () widely used conceptual framework of the implementation process to assess how CRAs react to the announcement of an austerity program. This framework is particularly well‐suited to capture the implementation of austerity measures, which constitute centrally designed top‐level policy decisions that are often imposed under external pressure where “compliance is imposed from the top” (Exadaktylos and Zahariadis , 163).…”

“…Like Exadaktylos and Zahariadis () in their recent study on bailout reforms in Greece, we draw on Sabatier and Mazmanian's () widely used conceptual framework of the implementation process to assess how CRAs react to the announcement of an austerity program. This framework is particularly well‐suited to capture the implementation of austerity measures, which constitute centrally designed top‐level policy decisions that are often imposed under external pressure where “compliance is imposed from the top” (Exadaktylos and Zahariadis , 163). Concerning the implementation process, we analyze the degree of centralization to address the question of veto points, the strength of the public administration to grasp adequate resources and the composition of the ruling government to proxy political commitment and set these against macroeconomic variables, namely the level of competitiveness of the economy and the rescue architecture put in place by the European authorities since the outbreak of the crisis.…”

“…A decentralized political system features a larger number of veto players which can undermine central decisions and block state interventionism (Huber, Ragin, and Stephens ; Sager and Rüefli ; Tsebelis ). Austerity programs in particular tend to entail severe and abrupt cuts that can affect a wide range of players within the political system and give rise to opposition (Exadaktylos and Zahariadis ). As a second condition, a high number of veto players in a country (DC) could therefore negatively affect the CRAs’ evaluation of the likelihood that the austerity program will be successfully implemented.…”

“…To this end, we consider the implementation of an austerity program as the implementation of a public policy. Based on the conceptual framework by Sabatier and Mazmanian (; Exadaktylos and Zahariadis ; Hinterleitner, Sager, and Thomann ), our preliminary assumption is that—besides macroeconomic factors—implementation‐related factors should be considered by CRAs when evaluating an announced austerity program and its likely effect on fiscal sustainability. As sovereign ratings assess a state's ability to service its debt and austerity programs are passed to maintain this ability, austerity programs and sovereign ratings form a peculiar relationship: austerity programs are a signal to capital markets that a state is willing to honor its debt obligations (de Haan and Amtenbrink ), which in turn needs to be verified for its credibility.…”

Feeling the pulse of the Greek debt crisis: affect on the web of blame

“…Chalari (2014) examines subjective experiences and evaluations of citizens during the crisis employing interview data. Capelos and Exadaktylos (2015), and also Tzogopoulos (2013), study media representations of the crisis and focus on identifying coverage patterns and the stereotypes and preconceptions media reports adopt, while Exadaktylos and Zahariadis (2014) discuss the crisis implications for political trust.…”