“I’ll Be Glad I Did It” Reasoning and the Significance of Future Desires

Expecting the Unexpected

“…See, e.g., (Nagel 1970), (Parfit 1984), (Harman 2009), (Brink 2010). 23 Discussions of prefence-shift and decision theory include (Weirich 1981), (Ullmann-Margalit 24 2006), (Arntzenius 2008), (Briggs 2010).…”

The Ethics of Existence

“…In a similar vein, Elizabeth Harman appeals to the rational significance of love: “Because preferences for one's loved ones can be reasonable, what is reasonable to prefer changes over time ” (Harman : 188). When you are making the decision, you do not and cannot love S. What is relevant to your preference then is that a child will suffer if you do not wait to conceive, and that if you wait, the child you conceive will likely suffer less.…”

“…Harman's paper starts with an argument about parental preference, but later shifts to what “everyone should prefer” (Harman : 191). This has the kind of generality I have urged.…”

“…This has the kind of generality I have urged. But Harman immediately returns to a more limited view: “[my] discussion has emphasized the way that loving someone can make a preference for the actual outcome, though it is non‐optimal, reasonable”; “[the] cases I have discussed all involve a reasonable attachment ” (Harman : 192, 193). The fact that your attachment to S is reasonable might explain why your attitude should change; it cannot explain what “everyone should prefer,” since not everyone has, or should have, a loving relationship with S.…”

DISABILITY AND ADAPTIVE PREFERENCE1

“…37 37 See, inter alia, Brock (2005), Kahane (forthcoming), McMahan (2005a, 2005b). Harman (2009) develops one of the more detailed versions of the ‘explaining away’ strategy. Harman argues that the first‐person preferences of the disabled can be construed as strongly person‐affecting (e.g., they are happy with their disabled lives, and don't identify with the people they would have been had they not been disabled).…”