The Ethics of Existence

Setiya, Kieran

doi:10.1111/phpe.12045

Cited by 6 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…42 So, if the improvement claim is true, then there will be cases in which it is appropriate to be glad to have chosen an option that we knew to be impermissible prior to choosing-and that's odd. Setiya (2014b) and I disagree on several of points, we both agree that, if Lesserjoy has been created, then retrospective (all-things-considered) gladness is appropriate.…”

Section: / Lesserjoymentioning

confidence: 81%

The procreative asymmetry and the impossibility of elusive permission

Spencer

2021

Philos Stud

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be the actual world, and let be some possible world in which does not exist.According to Comparability, is better for than @ . But the following claim is tempting: Accessibility. If is better for than @ , then, if had been actual, (still) would have been better for than @ . 14 13 If people are necessary beings, as necessitists, like Williamson (2013), maintain, then we should replace talk of existence with talk of chunkiness.

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Section: / Lesserjoymentioning

confidence: 81%

The procreative asymmetry and the impossibility of elusive permission

Spencer

2021

Philos Stud

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“…Regret raises similar worries. Jeff McMahan [2005], Liz Harman [2009], Jay Wallace [2013], and Kieran Setiya [2014] have all discussed cases in which there seems to be a rational lack of regret about decisions the agents themselves judge unjustified, bad, or wrong. One of the most discussed cases in this context is Derek Parfit's case of the young girl's child [Parfit 1984: 358-59].…”

Section: D'arms and Jacobson Also Distinguish Between An Attitude Beimentioning

confidence: 99%

Emotions and Process Rationality

Na’aman

2020

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

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Some epistemologists hold that all rational norms are fundamentally concerned with the agent's states or attitudes at an individual time [Hedden 2015, 2016; Moss 2015]; others argue that all rational norms are fundamentally concerned with processes [Podgorski 2017]. This distinction is not drawn in discussions of emotional rationality. As a result, a widely held assumption in the literature on emotional rationality has gone unexamined. I employ Abelard Podgorski's argument from rational delay to argue that many emotional norms are fundamentally concerned with emotional processes. I also claim that the main response available to the synchronist about belief is not available to the synchronist about emotions and, therefore, fundamental process norms are more plausible than epistemologists tend to believe.

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“…23 Harman (2009) discusses this kind of preference in some detail. 24 There is a growing literature on these kinds of preferences; for a partial guide, see Setiya (2014) Parfit (1984), for example, assumes that it is incoherent for future generations to wish that we had conserved the environment. This is evident when he argues that they would happily waive her right to be born into good enough circumstances: his point is based on the idea that they should hardly wish that we had done otherwise.…”

Section: The Argument From Coherent Wishesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“… There is a growing literature on these kinds of preferences; for a partial guide, see Setiya () and references therein. …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%