I came, I saw, I hacked: Automated Generation of Process-independent Attacks for Industrial Control Systems

Sarkar, Esha; Benkraouda, Hadjer; Maniatakos, Michail

doi:10.1145/3320269.3384730

Cited by 11 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 25 publications

(35 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…These attacks impact the various critical processes of the plant by manipulating the controller and sensor data. Sarkar et al, 51 studied the impact of control‐theoretic attacks on the operational capabilities of the power plant. These attacks are different from the other attacks, as the designing of these attacks requires deep analysis of the sector on which it has to be launched.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

A systematic literature review on past attack analysis on industrial control systems

Goel

2024

Trans Emerging Tel Tech

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Industrial control systems are used to automate the monitoring and control of physical processes in large‐scale industries and critical infrastructure such as power plants, chemical treatment plants, manufacturing, and assembly line processes. Securing industrial control systems is important for the uninterrupted operation of these infrastructures, which are highly interconnected and becoming the prime target of attackers because disrupting these systems can have significant economic and safety implications and consequences such as power outages, environmental disasters, production shutdowns, or even physical harm. The past review works have discussed industrial control systems attacks, their impact, and exploited vulnerabilities separately and lack comprehension. In this work, an attempt has been made to understand the comprehensive picture of vulnerabilities, attacks, and their impact on industrial control systems. Past reviews published between 2014 and 2023 have been studied following a systematic literature review process, and a taxonomy and categorization of past attacks and defense mechanisms have been proposed and classified minutely for readers' interest. Vulnerabilities at the architecture, hardware, software, and communication network level have also been studied and presented. A deep understanding of past attacks, their impact, and identified potential causes is among the major contributions of this review. The results will enable researchers working in academics and industry to make effective decisions on safeguarding the industrial control systems against future attacks.

show abstract

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In literature, it has been observed that these attacks are targeted on sensors or actuators. 47 Sarkar et al, 51 mentioned that these attacks cause a deviation or perturbation in the physical quantity. These deviations can be of two types: stable and oscillatory.…”

Section: Control-theoretic Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

A systematic literature review on past attack analysis on industrial control systems

Goel

2024

Trans Emerging Tel Tech

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Attacking sensors means varying the water level in the tank. The authors in [ 50 , 51 ] studied an experimental setup to explain the disturbance in the water level in an ICS environment while attacking through actuators to vary the data linked pumping speed and implement a DoS attack. Attacking via the communication link between sensors and PLC means varying the PLC-collected data and getting water status information; attacking via the actuators and PLC communication link means changing the signals and sending wrong information.…”

Section: Attack and Defense Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Comprehensive Study on Cyber Attacks in Communication Networks in Water Purification and Distribution Plants: Challenges, Vulnerabilities, and Future Prospects

Aslam,

Tufail,

Kim

et al. 2023

Sensors

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In recent years, the Internet of Things (IoT) has had a big impact on both industry and academia. Its profound impact is particularly felt in the industrial sector, where the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT), also known as Industry 4.0, is revolutionizing manufacturing and production through the fusion of cutting-edge technologies and network-embedded sensing devices. The IIoT revolutionizes several industries, including crucial ones such as oil and gas, water purification and distribution, energy, and chemicals, by integrating information technology (IT) with industrial control and automation systems. Water, a vital resource for life, is a symbol of the advancement of technology, yet knowledge of potential cyberattacks and their catastrophic effects on water treatment facilities is still insufficient. Even seemingly insignificant errors can have serious consequences, such as aberrant pH values or fluctuations in the concentration of hydrochloric acid (HCI) in water, which can result in fatalities or serious diseases. The water purification and distribution industry has been the target of numerous hostile cyber security attacks, some of which have been identified, revealed, and documented in this paper. Our goal is to understand the range of security threats that are present in this industry. Through the lens of IIoT, the survey provides a technical investigation that covers attack models, actual cases of cyber intrusions in the water sector, a range of security difficulties encountered, and preventative security solutions. We also explore upcoming perspectives, illuminating the predicted advancements and orientations in this dynamic subject. For industrial practitioners and aspiring scholars alike, our work is a useful, enlightening, and current resource. We want to promote a thorough grasp of the cybersecurity landscape in the water industry by combining key insights and igniting group efforts toward a safe and dependable digital future.

show abstract

“…Attackers with access to HMIs have a larger view of the system than individual PLCs. Attackers with access to HMIs could infer a more general view of the system, such as the type of industry they control [28].…”

Section: Process Knowledge Data Sourcesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Due to the large number of attacks required to obtain the ground-truth, we opted for a simulated environment where the attacks can be executed without safety concerns. The simulated plant is known as the Tennessee Eastman Plant and has been extensively used in previous cybersecurity research [7,13,15,16,28].…”

Section: Experimental Evaluationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Identifying Near-Optimal Single-Shot Attacks on ICSs with Limited Process Knowledge

Esquivel-Vargas

Castellanos

Caselli

et al. 2022

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) rely on insecure protocols and devices to monitor and operate critical infrastructure. Prior work has demonstrated that powerful attackers with detailed system knowledge can manipulate exchanged sensor data to deteriorate performance of the process, even leading to full shutdowns of plants. Identifying those attacks requires iterating over all possible sensor values, and running detailed system simulation or analysis to identify optimal attacks. That setup allows adversaries to identify attacks that are most impactful when applied on the system for the first time, before the system operators become aware of the manipulations. In this work, we investigate if constrained attackers without detailed system knowledge and simulators can identify comparable attacks. In particular, the attacker only requires abstract knowledge on general information flow in the plant, instead of precise algorithms, operating parameters, process models, or simulators. We propose an approach that allows single-shot attacks, i.e., near-optimal attacks that are reliably shutting down a system on the first try. The approach is applied and validated on two use cases, and demonstrated to achieve comparable results to prior work, which relied on detailed system information and simulations.

show abstract

I came, I saw, I hacked: Automated Generation of Process-independent Attacks for Industrial Control Systems

Cited by 11 publications

References 25 publications

A systematic literature review on past attack analysis on industrial control systems

A systematic literature review on past attack analysis on industrial control systems

A Comprehensive Study on Cyber Attacks in Communication Networks in Water Purification and Distribution Plants: Challenges, Vulnerabilities, and Future Prospects

Identifying Near-Optimal Single-Shot Attacks on ICSs with Limited Process Knowledge

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About