“I Am a Muslim Not an Extremist”: How the Prevent Strategy Has Constructed a “Suspect” Community

Abstract

The aim of this article is to examine the new Prevent Strategy 2011 in the United Kingdom and critically analyze its impact upon British Muslim communities. The U.K. government's controversial Prevent Strategy 2011 has come under fierce opposition, with critics arguing that it will not actually prevent extremism but risks labeling the Muslim community as a “suspect” community. Following the British government review of counterterrorism policies and strategies in 2010, the article examines the key question: Will the new Prevent policy actually work? Recent studies show that previous Prevent policies have risked alienating the Muslim community (Kundnani). Indeed, the new Prevent Strategy 2011 also has the risk of the depoliticization of Muslim communities from wider civic society and risks creating a mosaic for extremist ideologies. The article argues that, in practice, Prevent is not particularly efficacious, and that the new strategy risks further marginalizing and stigmatizing Muslim communities. Related Articles Related Media BBC News. . “State Multiculturalism Has Failed, Says David Cameron.” http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk‐politics‐12371994 BBC News. . “Funding Cut for Extremist Groups in Terrorism Review.” http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk‐13678635 BBC Radio 4. . “The Report: Extremism in the UK.” http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b0132p8m El objetivo de este artículo es examinar la nueva Estrategia de Prevención 2011 (Prevent Strategy 2011) en el Reino Unido y analizar críticamente su impacto en las comunidades musulmanas británicas. La controversial Estrategia de Prevención 2011 del gobierno del Reino Unido ha sido objeto de una fuerte oposición, con críticos afirmando que no prevendrá el extremismo y se arriesgará el encasillar a la comunidad musulmana como una comunidad “sospechosa.” Luego de la modificación del gobierno británico de sus políticas y estrategias contra el terrorismo del 2010, este artículo examina la pregunta clave: ¿funcionará la nueva política de prevención? Estudios recientes muestran que políticas de prevención anteriores han corrido el riesgo de alienar a la comunidad musulmana (Kundnani). En efecto, la nueva Estrategia de Prevención 2011 también corre el riego de despolitizar a la comunidad musulmana de la sociedad civil y se arriesga a crear un mosaico de ideologías extremistas. Este artículo sostiene que en la práctica, Prevención 2011 no es particularmente eficaz y que la nueva estrategia expone a una mayor marginalización y estigmatización de las comunidades musulmanas.

Security Traps and Discourses of Radicalization: Examining Surveillance Practices Targeting Muslims in Canada

“…This is particularly true for populations that are deemed risky as opposed to simply at risk. For Muslims in Canada-and other Western countries-the risks of profiling, harassment, and criminalization are immediate (Awan 2012; see also Elghawaby 2013). Additionally, proliferating apparatuses of surveillance present a significant "chilling effect" across the social field (Boycoff 2007;Deflem 2008), particularly social movements at odds with government policies (Monaghan and Walby 2012a).…”

“…As a result, many of these initiatives are regarded as innovative best practices by Canada's international partners" (PSC 2011: 49). Despite efforts to present Canada as a leader in CVE practices, documents produced by Canadian security governance agencies are replete with references, anecdotes, and examples from international partnersalmost always from either the U.K. or U.S. Awan (2012) has detailed how counter-radicalization efforts in the U.K. have constructed "suspect communities" that leave Muslim communities feeling isolated, discriminated against, and increasingly criminalized. Canadian officials, often citing the successfulness of the U.K. "Prevent" strategy, are positioned to follow a similar course and, in effect, risk fulfilling Hacking's "looping effect" (1995) where human kinds are reconstituted to fit the categories that have been pre-designed to understand them.…”

“…While Canadian authorities have devoted considerable resources to the "grave challenge" of violent extremism and radicalization only recently, these policing and security efforts have been underway in Europe for several years (Awan 2012;IRR 2010). Despite recent debates on the threat of radicalization and various sources or explanations of radicalization (see Brooks 2011;Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010;McCauley and Moskalenko 2011;Sedgwick 2010) studies on security and surveillance practices that target radicalization have been more difficult.…”

“…Canada's adoption of discourses of radicalization and extremism can be in large part attributed to domestic ("homegrown") Awan 2012), elastic notions of radicalization are used to assess a broad spectrum of potential threat.…”

‘Under Heavy Manners?’: Social Work, Radicalisation, Troubled Families and Non-Linear War

“…Wider criticism of PREVENT and Channel has been significant, with its targeting of the Muslim population in particular areas (Kundani 2014), to raising an unfounded level of suspicion centred on the Muslim population (Awan 2012) and its lack of recognition of the complexities of applying a generalised notion of "community to a diverse and evolving environment" (Spalek 2013: ). Coppock and McGovern (2015) argue that the "interventions" themselves are based on positivist psychological models that essentially focus on individuals at risk, rather than considering the wider social-economic and political context.…”