I.—a Suggested Non-Naturalistic Analysis of Good

Ewing, A. C.

doi:10.1093/mind/xlviii.189.1

Cited by 55 publications

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“…I do not insist that we analyze or reduce goodness and badness to reasons to want or to prefer. But it seems to me that there is a true biconditional in the vicinity: that an outcome x is good if and only if there is strong reason, or one ought (Ewing ), or it is fitting (Broad ) to desire x , and that something similar holds for betterness.…”

Section: The Goodness and Badness Principlesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Good, the Bad, and the Transitivity of *Better Than**

Nebel

2017

Nous

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The Rachels-Temkin spectrum arguments against the transitivity of better than involve good or bad experiences, lives, or outcomes that vary along multiple dimensions-e.g., duration and intensity of pleasure or pain. This paper presents variations on these arguments involving combinations of good and bad experiences, which have even more radical implications than the violation of transitivity. These variations force opponents of transitivity to conclude that something good is worse than something that isn't good, on pain of rejecting the good altogether. That is impossible, so we must reject the spectrum arguments. According toThe Transitivity of Better Than: For any bearers of value A, B, and C, if A is better than B, all things considered, and B is better than C, all things considered, then A is better than C, all things considered.

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Section: The Goodness and Badness Principlesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Good, the Bad, and the Transitivity of *Better Than**

Nebel

2017

Nous

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“…This sort of ''ought,'' Ewing proposed, is not a moral notion and, moreover, it does not imply ''can.'' However, he insisted that the moral ''ought'' does imply ''can'' (Ewing 1939(Ewing , 1947. Consider, next, some of Zimmerman's views on the ''ought'' of fittingness (or, as he prefers to say, the '''ought' of requirement'').…”

Section: On ''Ought'' Implies ''Can''mentioning

confidence: 99%

Reason, Responsibility, and Free Will: Reply to My Critics

Haji¹

2012

J Ethics

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This paper highlights and discusses some key positions on free will and moral responsibility that I have defended. I begin with reflections on a Strawsonian analysis of moral responsibility. Then I take up objections to the view that there is an asymmetry in freedom requirements for moral responsibility and moral obligation: obligation but not responsibility requires that we could have done otherwise. I follow with some thoughts on the viability of different sorts of semi-compatibilism. Next, I turn to defending the ''luck objection'' to a popular libertarian account of the control that responsibility requires. This is, roughly, the objection that when our decisions are indeterministically caused, their occurrence is a matter of responsibility-undermining luck. Finally, I comment on Frankfurt examples.

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“…2 For views along these lines, see Brentano ( 1969 ), Tappolet ( 2000 ), D' Arms andJacobson ( 2000 , 2006 ), Olson ( 2004 ), Danielson and Olson ( 2007 ). 3 Ewing ( 1939 ) suggests that "ought" is the alternative that should be chosen. Note, however, that Ewing distinguishes this "ought" from what he calls the "moral ought".…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The FA Analysis of Emotional Values and Practical Reasons

Lemaire

2012

Dialogue

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Confronted with the "wrong kind of reason problem", several proponents of the fi tting attitude analysis of emotional values have argued in favor of an epistemic approach. In such a view, an emotion fi ts its object because the emotion is correct. However, I argue that we should reorient our search towards a practical approach because only practical considerations can provide a satisfying explanation of the fi ttingness of emotional responses. This practical approach is partially revisionist, particularly because it is no longer an analysis of fi nal value and because it is relativistic.RÉSUMÉ: Confrontés au problème posé par les raisons non pertinentes, plusieurs défenseurs de l'analyse des valeurs émotionnelles en termes d'attitudes approprié ont proposé une approche épistémique. Selon celle-ci, une émotion est appropriée parce qu'elle est correcte. Je soutiens cependant que nous devrions plutôt orienter nos recherches dans le sens d'une approche pratique car seules les considérations pratiques sont en mesure d'expliquer de façon satisfaisante le caractère appropriée d'une émotion pertinent pour cette analyse. Une telle approche sera partiellement révisionniste en particulier parce qu'elle n'est plus une analyse de valeur fi nale et parce qu'elle est relativiste.

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I.—a Suggested Non-Naturalistic Analysis of Good

Cited by 55 publications

References 0 publications

The Good, the Bad, and the Transitivity of *Better Than**

The Good, the Bad, and the Transitivity of *Better Than**

Reason, Responsibility, and Free Will: Reply to My Critics

The FA Analysis of Emotional Values and Practical Reasons

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I.—a Suggested Non-Naturalistic Analysis of Good

Cited by 55 publications

References 0 publications

The Good, the Bad, and the Transitivity of Better Than*

The Good, the Bad, and the Transitivity of Better Than*

Reason, Responsibility, and Free Will: Reply to My Critics

The FA Analysis of Emotional Values and Practical Reasons

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About

The Good, the Bad, and the Transitivity of *Better Than**

The Good, the Bad, and the Transitivity of *Better Than**