Reason, Responsibility, and Free Will: Reply to My Critics

Haji, Ishtiyaque

doi:10.1007/s10892-012-9124-8

Cited by 5 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 49 publications

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“…The Luck Argument (Hume 1739(Hume /1978Nowell-Smith 1948;Russell 1984;Waller 1988;Haji 1999Haji , 2001Haji , 2012Haji , 2013Mele 1999van Inwagen 2000;Schlosser 2014) defends a negative answer to these questions. According to proponents of the Luck Argument, indeterminism is actually incompatible with free will.…”

Section: Locating the Luck And Mind Argumentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Routledge Companion to Free Will

Timpe

Griffith

Levy³

2016

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Questions concerning free will are intertwined with issues in almost every area of philosophy, from metaphysics to mind to moral philosophy, and are also informed by work in different areas of science (principally physics, neuroscience and social psychology). Free will is also a perennial concern of serious thinkers, in theology and in non-western traditions as much as in contemporary academic philosophy. Because free will can be approached from so many different perspectives and has implications for so many debates, a comprehensive survey needs to encompass an enormous range of approaches. This book is the fi rst to draw together leading experts on every aspect of the debate, from those who are central to the current philosophical debate, to non-western perspectives, scientifi c contributions, and the rich history of the debate. Its 61 chapters, commissioned especially for this volume from the world's leading researchers, are framed by a General Introduction and brief section introductions for each of the six sections. A list of References, an annotated Further Reading list, and a short list of Related Topics are included at the end of each chapter.Kevin Timpe holds the W. H. Jellema Chair in Christian Philosophy at Calvin College. He has published a number of books on free will, including

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Section: Locating the Luck And Mind Argumentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Recall that the varying formulations of the Luck Argument employ and/or defend (LA1) and (LA2). The Ensurance Formulation of the Luck Argument has been most clearly and forcefully defended by Ishtiyaque Haji (1999Haji ( , 2001Haji ( , 2012Haji ( , 2013cf. Schlosser 2014).…”

Section: The Ensurance Formulationmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Routledge Companion to Free Will

Timpe

Griffith

Levy³

2016

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“…(From (3) and (4)) (6) Therefore, if determinism is true, no person ever acts wrongly. (From (2) and (5)) 1 See, for instance, Haji 2002Haji , 2003Haji , 2006Haji , 2009Haji , 2012aHaji , 2012bHaji , 2012c What do I mean by substantive practical deontic judgements? An example of a substantive judgement is the judgement that someone has a reason to do a certain thing.…”

Section: Haji's Challengementioning

confidence: 99%

The Ramifications of Error Theories about the Deontic

Andrić

2015

Acta Anal

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Error theories about practical deontic judgements claim that no substantive practical deontic judgement is true. Practical deontic judgements are practical (rather than theoretical) in the sense that they concern actions (rather than beliefs), and they are deontic (rather than evaluative) in the sense that they are about reasons, rightness, wrongness, and obligations (rather than about goodness, badness, and so on). This paper assumes the truth of an error theory about practical deontic judgements in order to examine its ramifications. I defend three contentions. The first is that, if so-called fitting-attitude analyses of value fail, the truth of some substantive evaluative judgements would not be threatened by the fact that no substantive practical deontic judgment is true. Secondly, in light of the truth of these evaluative judgements, the best thing we could do is to continue to make practical deontic judgements despite the truth of an error theory about practical deontic judgements. My third contention is that, if some evaluative judgements are unaffected by an error theory about practical deontic judgements, then such an error theory will eventually lead us to some version of consequentialism.Keywords Moral error theory . Deontic morality . Values . Consequentialism . Ishtiyaque Haji Error theories about practical deontic judgements claim that no substantive practical deontic judgement is true. Practical deontic judgements are practical (rather than theoretical) in the sense that they concern actions (rather than beliefs), and they are deontic (rather than evaluative) in the sense that they are about reasons, rightness, wrongness, and obligations (rather than about goodness, badness, and so on). This paper assumes the truth of an error theory about practical deontic judgements in order to examine its ramifications. I defend three contentions. The first is that the truth of some substantive evaluative judgements is not threatened by the assumption that no Acta Anal

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Reflections on Obligation and Blameworthiness

Haji

2017

Reflections on Ethics and Responsibility

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Reason, Responsibility, and Free Will: Reply to My Critics

Cited by 5 publications

References 49 publications

The Routledge Companion to Free Will

The Routledge Companion to Free Will

The Ramifications of Error Theories about the Deontic

Reflections on Obligation and Blameworthiness

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