“Hybrid institutions”: Applications of common property theory beyond discrete tenure regimes

Abstract

Property rights theory has contributed a great deal to global understanding of the factors shaping the management, governance and sustainability of discrete property regimes (individual, State, commons). Yet as the commons become increasingly altered and enclosed and management challenges extend beyond the boundaries of any given unit of property, institutional theory must extend beyond discrete property regimes. This paper argues that as natural resource management challenges grow more complex and interconnected, common property theory in the Ostrom tradition remains an essential component of successful management solutions -for common pool resources, public and private goods alike. Building on the commons and externality literature in general, and the Ostrom and Coasean traditions in particular, we propose the use of the term "hybrid institution" to explore the governance of common or connected interests within and between diverse property regimes. Following a general introduction to a set of propositions for encompassing this expanded realm of application of commons theory, we use the literature on integrated natural resource management to frame the scope of "commons" issues facing rural communities today. Empirical and action research from eastern Africa and logical arguments are each used to illustrate and sharpen the focus of our propositions so that they can be tested and refined in future research. This analysis demonstrates the instrumental potential of the concept of hybrid institutions as a framework for shaping more productive engagements with seemingly intractable natural 572 Laura Anne German and Andrew Keeler resource management challenges at farm and landscape scale. Our analysis suggests that central elements of the Ostrom and Coasean traditions can be complementary explanatory lenses for contemporary resource conflict and management.

Do collective property rights make sense? Insights from central Vietnam

“…Potentially useful policy responses to the challenges of rural poverty have emerged in Vietnam, including our three cases of community forestry, the re-allocation of state land to individual households, and territorial use rights for fisheries. Each of our cases represents different social and ecological situations, demonstrating the need for flexible governance arrangements beyond discrete property regimes (c.f., German and Keeler 2010). In the case of the state forest land re-allocation, this is an example of the individualization of forest land for conversion into agriculture and short-cycle agro-forestry such as acacia.…”

“…Resourcebased activities shift, depending upon, among other things, household needs, local ecologies and market opportunities. For these reasons, conventional categorization or advocacy of private, collective or public rights rarely account for the complex realities found in particular places (Barry and Meinzen-Dick 2008;German and Keeler 2010). Many property rights arrangements tend to enclose specific areas or reduce some people's access to specific goods.…”

Pemodelan Skenario Kebijakan Pengentasan Kemiskinan Di Indonesia Dengan Metode Promethee

“…Temuan tentang keunggulan pola model hybrid ini sesuai dengan pernyataan para peneliti terdahulu tentang model hybrid yang menjadi alternatif terbaik model kelembagaan tatkala berhadapan dengan banyak aktor yang terlibat dalam penyelesaian permasalahan yang kompleks (German, 2010;Proff, 2015;Menard dan Shirley, 2014).…”

Stakeholder Perceptions of an Ecosystem Services Approach to Clearing Invasive Alien Plants on Private Land

“…This belief seems to be based primarily on a perception that landowners hold knowledge of local resource dynamics that is superior to that of government. Landowners viewed themselves as best qualified for conducting the IAP clearing work and thus, landowner command of IAP management was justified as the most cost-effective and pragmatic alternative (Coase 1960, http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol18/iss1/art26/ Siebert et al 2006, German andKeeler 2010). These landowners also tended to believe that they have an ethical duty to steward their property, and thus to clear IAPs.…”