Husserl on Personal Level Explanation

Williams, Heath

doi:10.1007/s10746-020-09537-4

Cited by 12 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…Accordingly, there is certainly another motivation regarding the association of phenomenology and the personal level here; motivation that concerns deeper, perceived connections between some proponents of the philosophy of the personal level and philosophical phenomenology. These deeper philosophical connections have already been the topic of one paper (Williams, 2020b) and will feature as the subject of another paper in the future. Determining exactly what was imputed by authors who draw a connection between big-P phenomenology and 'the personal' (see footnote 4) possibly requires more speculation than is desirable, and certainly more space than is left here.…”

Section: Whither Phenomenology?mentioning

confidence: 87%

The unbearable lightness of the personal, explanatory level

Williams

2022

Phenom Cogn Sci

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I begin this paper by demonstrating that there is a perceived overlap between phenomenology and the personal level. This perception has recently played a decisive role in evaluating phenomenological contributions to discussions within cognitive science, for example, on topics of social cognition. In this paper, I aim not only to understand what might be meant by associating phenomenology with the personal level, but to cast this association in a critical light. I show that the personal level is essentially an explanatory level, whereby perceptions and mental state terms (paradigmatically, belief and desire) explain purposive action. I then separate the notion of consciousness from the notion of the personal level. To do so, I advance Wittgenstein’s private language argument in conjunction with Sellars’ account of how the meaning of mental state terms derives from their explanatory function. Using the Wittgenstinian/Sellarsian picture as guide, I show that characterising personal level explanations by reference to conscious experiences imputes excess baggage over and above the commitment to a unique explanatory level. Yet, for many, ‘phenomenology’ is the level of conscious experience. I argue that it is when the extra baggage of assuming that we are aware of our explanatory, personal level mental states is coupled with the controversial claim that phenomenology is tantamount to the verbalisation of conscious states that the ill begotten association between them is arises.

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Section: Whither Phenomenology?mentioning

confidence: 87%

The unbearable lightness of the personal, explanatory level

Williams

2022

Phenom Cogn Sci

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“…On the explanatory account of motivational causality, seeCaminada (2019, 91-119),Spano (2021),Williams (2020aWilliams ( , 2020b.…”

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confidence: 99%

Phenomenological explanation: towards a methodological integration in phenomenological psychopathology

Summa

2022

Phenom Cogn Sci

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Whether, and in what sense, research in phenomenology and phenomenological psychopathology has—in addition to its descriptive and hermeneutic value—explanatory power is somewhat controversial. This paper shows why it is legitimate to recognize such explanatory power. To this end, the paper analyzes two central concerns underlying the debate about explanation in phenomenology: (a) the warning against reductionism, which is implicit in a conception of causal explanation exclusively based on models of natural/physical causation; and (b) the warning against top-down generalizations, which neglect the specificity of the individual. While acknowledging that these two caveats express serious concerns regarding the debate on explanatory models, I show that phenomenology has the resources to respond to them. These can be found in analyses of different types of causation relating to different regions of reality and in the structure of explanatory models based on exemplarity. On the basis of these analyses, I defend a pluralist account vis-à-vis explanatory models.

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Husserl’s Theory of Scientific Explanation: A Bolzanian Inspired Unificationist Account

Williams

Byrne

2022

Husserl Stud

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Husserl’s early picture of explanation in the sciences has never been completely provided. This lack represents an oversight, which we here redress. In contrast to currently accepted interpretations, we demonstrate that Husserl does not adhere to the much maligned deductive-nomological (DN) model of scientific explanation. Instead, via a close reading of early Husserlian texts, we reveal that he presents a unificationist account of scientific explanation. By doing so, we disclose that Husserl’s philosophy of scientific explanation is no mere anachronism. It is, instead, tenable and relevant. We discuss how Husserl and other contemporary thinkers draw theoretical inspiration from the same source—namely, Bernard Bolzano. Husserl’s theory of scientific explanation shares a common language and discusses the same themes as, for example, Phillip Kitcher and Kit Fine. To advance our novel reading, we discuss Husserl’s investigations of grounding, inter-lawful explanation, intra-mathematical explanation, and scientific unification.

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Husserl on Personal Level Explanation

Cited by 12 publications

References 21 publications

The unbearable lightness of the personal, explanatory level

The unbearable lightness of the personal, explanatory level

Phenomenological explanation: towards a methodological integration in phenomenological psychopathology

Husserl’s Theory of Scientific Explanation: A Bolzanian Inspired Unificationist Account

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