“…Such an account of clarity and distinctness has been suggested in the secondary literature, typically with reference to Descartes' account of the same: Hume never defines clarity and distinctness himself, but he is obviously drawing on the familiar Cartesian terminology, in which to be clear is to be ‘present and open to the attentive mind’, and to be distinct is to be free from any hidden detail or confusion …. (Holden 2014, p.388, ft.10)For both Descartes and Locke, moreover, the distinctness of an idea involves its insusceptibility to being confused with others. It is plausible, therefore that the restriction to clear and distinct ideas in [THN 1.1.7.6] is intended to ensure that the correct principle stated in [A 11] is not misapplied through inaccuracy, confusion, or lack of specificity about what exactly is being conceived.…”
Section: Clarity and Distinctness As Accuracymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Hume never defines clarity and distinctness himself, but he is obviously drawing on the familiar Cartesian terminology, in which to be clear is to be ‘present and open to the attentive mind’, and to be distinct is to be free from any hidden detail or confusion …. (Holden 2014, p.388, ft.10)…”
Section: Clarity and Distinctness As Accuracymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…51 Holden (2014) defends an expressivist account of modality in Hume; similarly, Boehm (2013, p. 77) takes the 'conceivability test' (the impossibility of conceiving the lack of a certain relation between two ideas) to be constitutive of intuitive or demonstrative necessity, rather than a mere test of it (as opposed to, e.g. Beebee 2006, p.30).…”
Section: Clarity and Distinctness As Freedom From Defectivenessmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Accounts founded on linguistic conventions are perhaps natural extensions of expressivist theories of modality such as Holden (2014). In this regard, we might compare it with Hume's moral theory, which makes use of the public nature of moral language to standardise our ideas and discourse on moral issues (EPM 5.42), which allows for his sentimentalist ethics to be, if not objective, then at least inter-subjective.…”
In this paper, I will make the case that an associative account of predication in Hume seems to allow for impossible predicative conceptions—that is, the conceiving of impossible states of affairs involving subjects instantiating properties or qualities—which violate his Conceivability Principle. The natural response is to argue that such conceptions are not clear and distinct, but substantive worries are raised about a number of attempted solutions along these lines. This poses a predicament for Hume scholars: either we must modify or abandon the Conceivability Principle, or reject an associative account of predication, or concede that Hume faces a difficulty he cannot solve.
“…Such an account of clarity and distinctness has been suggested in the secondary literature, typically with reference to Descartes' account of the same: Hume never defines clarity and distinctness himself, but he is obviously drawing on the familiar Cartesian terminology, in which to be clear is to be ‘present and open to the attentive mind’, and to be distinct is to be free from any hidden detail or confusion …. (Holden 2014, p.388, ft.10)For both Descartes and Locke, moreover, the distinctness of an idea involves its insusceptibility to being confused with others. It is plausible, therefore that the restriction to clear and distinct ideas in [THN 1.1.7.6] is intended to ensure that the correct principle stated in [A 11] is not misapplied through inaccuracy, confusion, or lack of specificity about what exactly is being conceived.…”
Section: Clarity and Distinctness As Accuracymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Hume never defines clarity and distinctness himself, but he is obviously drawing on the familiar Cartesian terminology, in which to be clear is to be ‘present and open to the attentive mind’, and to be distinct is to be free from any hidden detail or confusion …. (Holden 2014, p.388, ft.10)…”
Section: Clarity and Distinctness As Accuracymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…51 Holden (2014) defends an expressivist account of modality in Hume; similarly, Boehm (2013, p. 77) takes the 'conceivability test' (the impossibility of conceiving the lack of a certain relation between two ideas) to be constitutive of intuitive or demonstrative necessity, rather than a mere test of it (as opposed to, e.g. Beebee 2006, p.30).…”
Section: Clarity and Distinctness As Freedom From Defectivenessmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Accounts founded on linguistic conventions are perhaps natural extensions of expressivist theories of modality such as Holden (2014). In this regard, we might compare it with Hume's moral theory, which makes use of the public nature of moral language to standardise our ideas and discourse on moral issues (EPM 5.42), which allows for his sentimentalist ethics to be, if not objective, then at least inter-subjective.…”
In this paper, I will make the case that an associative account of predication in Hume seems to allow for impossible predicative conceptions—that is, the conceiving of impossible states of affairs involving subjects instantiating properties or qualities—which violate his Conceivability Principle. The natural response is to argue that such conceptions are not clear and distinct, but substantive worries are raised about a number of attempted solutions along these lines. This poses a predicament for Hume scholars: either we must modify or abandon the Conceivability Principle, or reject an associative account of predication, or concede that Hume faces a difficulty he cannot solve.
“…But … if Hume holds that the conceivability principle and the inconceivability principle are equivalent (as the mind‐dependent interpretation would have it, and as T 1.2.2.8 suggests), then there would be no need to repeatedly state “both” principles, since they are really one and the same. (Holden : 393 n. 15)…”
Section: Conceivability Inconceivability and Possibilitymentioning
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