Human security of urban migrant populations affected by length of residence and environmental hazards

Warning about dire effects of climate change on armed conflict is a recent variation of a scenario that has been promoted by environmental pessimists for over two centuries. The essence is that human activities lead to resource scarcities that in turn will generate famine, pestilence, and war. This essay reviews three stages of the argument: first, the original Malthusian thesis that focused on food production. Second, the broader neoMalthusian concern from the 1970s about limits to growth and developing scarcities in a range of necessities. And recently, the specter of climate change. In each phase, the Malthusians have met firm opposition from environmental optimists, who argue that emerging scarcities can be countered by human ingenuity, technological progress, and national and international economic and political institutions and that environmental change is not in itself a major driver of human violence. In the third phase, the Malthusian case appears to be stronger because human activities have reached a level where they have a truly global impact. Environmental optimists still insist that these problems can be overcome by human ingenuity and that the long-term trend towards less violence in human affairs is unlikely to be reversed by climate change. The stakes seem higher, but the structure of the debate remains largely the same.

Section: Climate Change – a Game Changer?mentioning

confidence: 99%

This time is different! Or is it? NeoMalthusians and environmental optimists in the age of climate change

Gleditsch

2020

“…2 Yet, rapid urbanization processes, when not managed well, can pose severe economic, social, political or environmental challenges, including strong pressure on the labor market, an inadequate provision of social services, such as health, education, housing and infrastructure, or water and energy systems. These challenges might subsequently trigger insecurity (Adger et al, 2021) and ethnic hatreds (Gaikwad & Nellis, 2017) that could fuel social unrest and political violence (Koren, Bagozzi & Benson, 2021; Buhaug, Cederman & Gleditsch, 2014; Goldstone, 2002; Brennan, 1999; Gizewski & Homer-Dixon, 1995).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Environmental migrants and social-movement participation

Koubi

Nguyễn

Spilker

et al. 2020

The displacement of people due to climatic changes (environmental migration) presents major societal and governance challenges. This article examines whether and how climate-induced rural-to-urban migration contributes to social-movement participation. We argue that the mainly forceful nature of relocation makes environmental migrants more likely to join and participate in social movements that promote migrant rights in urban areas. Using original survey data from Kenya, we find that individuals who had experienced several different types of severe climatic events at their previous location are more likely to join and participate in social movements. This finding has important policy implications. National and local authorities should not only provide immediate assistance and basic social services to environmental migrants in urban settings, but also facilitate permanent solutions by fostering their socio-economic and political integration in order to prevent urban conflict.

“…Local (idiosyncratic) conditions remain important for unrest occurrence (Chenoweth, Hendrix & Hunter, 2019), and can most likely explain the eight cases in our sample that remained unexplained by the QCA. In-depth, qualitative studies could address such gaps (Adger et al, 2021) and might also be able to provide important inputs regarding how to solve issues of conflict underreporting in remote regions and autocratic states.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

First comes the river, then comes the conflict? A qualitative comparative analysis of flood-related political unrest

Ide

Kristensen

Bartusevičius

2020

Disasters triggered by natural hazards will increase in the future due to climate change, population growth, and more valuable assets located in vulnerable areas. The impacts of disasters on political conflict have been the subject of broad academic and public debates. Existing research has paid little attention to the links between climate change, disasters, and small-scale conflicts, such as protests or riots. Floods are particularly relevant in this context as they are the most frequent and most costly contemporary disasters. However, they remain understudied compared to other disasters, specifically, droughts and storms. We address these gaps by focusing on flood-related political unrest between 2015 and 2018 in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Drawing on data from the Dartmouth Flood Observatory (DFO) and Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED), we find that flood-related political unrest occurs within two months after 24% of the 92 large flooding events recorded in our sample. Subsequently, a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) shows that the simultaneous presence of a large population, a democratic regime, and either the exclusion of ethnic groups from political power or a heavy impact of the flood is an important scope condition for the onset of flood-related political unrest. This indicates that disaster–conflict links are by no means deterministic. Rather, they are contingent on complex interactions between multiple contextual factors.