Environmental migrants and social-movement participation

Does internal migration following natural hazards increase the likelihood of protests in migrant-receiving areas? To address the question, this study first looks at the extent to which experiencing different forms of natural hazards contributes to a household’s decision to leave their district of residence. In a second step, the article explores whether that internal migration flow increases the number of protest events in migrant-hosting districts. In doing so, it contributes to the existing debate on the extent to which natural hazards impact the likelihood of social contention, and the role of migration as a linking pathway in that relationship. The impact of climate-related shocks may erode household assets and therefore adaptive capacity in ways that can eventually influence decisions to migrate to larger urban centres. Although migrants are agents of economical and technological change, urban environments may impose challenges to recently arrived migrants and their host communities, affecting the motivations and mobilization resources of urban social groups to protest. As a consequence, the probability of urban unrest in these locations is expected to increase. To test this, I use geo-referenced household-level data from Bangladesh for the period 2010–15, which records households’ experiences of different forms of natural hazard and internal migration flows, available from the Bangladesh Integrated Household Survey. It combines this with data on protests, derived from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data. Findings suggest that flood hazards in combination with loss of assets increase the likelihood of internal migration, but unlike other types of domestic mobility, hazard-related migration does not increase the frequency of protests in migrants’ districts of destination.

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Natural hazards, internal migration and protests in Bangladesh

Petrova

2021

“…Buhaug & Urdal (2013) find that observed conflict in growing cities is not associated with population growth and high population densities in 55 African and Asian cities that have experienced such growth, driven by migration. Petrova (2021) shows that urban migrants displaced from rural areas in Bangladesh are not more likely to be involved in protest and conflict, while Koubi et al (2021) suggest that migrants displaced by weather-related disasters in Kenya engage more in pro-social advocacy and engage in social movements. Cities are, of course, net importers of food.…”

Section: Climate Change Migration and Conflictmentioning

confidence: 99%

Human security of urban migrant populations affected by length of residence and environmental hazards

Adger

Campos

Siddiqui

et al. 2020

It is widely suggested that migration is a key mechanism linking climate change to violent conflict, particularly through migration increasing the risks of conflict in urban destinations. Yet climate change also creates new forms of insecurity through distress migration, immobility and vulnerability that are prevalent in urban destination locations. Here we examine the extent and nature of human security in migration destinations and test whether insecurity is affected by length of residence and environmental hazards. The study develops an index measure of human security at the individual level to include environmental and climate-related hazards as well as sources of well-being, fear of crime and violence, and mental health outcomes. It examines the elements of human security that explain the prevalence of insecurity among recent and established migrants in low-income urban neighbourhoods. The study reports on data collected in Chattogram in Bangladesh through a survey of migrants (N = 447) and from qualitative data derived using photo elicitation techniques with cohorts of city planners and migrants. The results show that environmental hazards represent an increasing source of perceived insecurity to migrant populations over time, with longer-term migrants perceiving greater insecurity than more recent arrivals, suggesting lack of upward social mobility in low-income slums. Ill-health, fear of eviction, and harassment and violence are key elements of how insecurity is experienced, and these are exacerbated by environmental hazards such as flooding. The study expands the concept of security to encompass central elements of personal risk and well-being and outlines the implications for climate change.

“…If public institutions or other social groups are considered responsible for the disasters – for instance, due to insufficient preparation, late and inadequate relief, and biased reconstruction efforts – such grievances might result in protests (Ide et al, 2020b). Flood-related migration can also be a source of discontent, both among the displaced population (which may perceive existing support as inadequate) and among people in the destination areas (which may oppose the inflow of ‘outsiders’) (Ghimire, Ferreira & Dorfman, 2015; Koubi et al, 2021; Petrova, 2021).…”

Section: When Do Floods Cause Political Unrest?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Our analysis of political unrest contributes evidence to the growing literature on low-intensity conflict. Political unrest can be a driver of social change (Kadivar & Caren, 2016; Koubi et al, 2021) and can be a starting point for large-scale civil conflict (e.g. Bartusevičius & Gleditsch, 2019; Cunningham et al, 2017).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

First comes the river, then comes the conflict? A qualitative comparative analysis of flood-related political unrest

Ide

Kristensen

Bartusevičius

2020

Disasters triggered by natural hazards will increase in the future due to climate change, population growth, and more valuable assets located in vulnerable areas. The impacts of disasters on political conflict have been the subject of broad academic and public debates. Existing research has paid little attention to the links between climate change, disasters, and small-scale conflicts, such as protests or riots. Floods are particularly relevant in this context as they are the most frequent and most costly contemporary disasters. However, they remain understudied compared to other disasters, specifically, droughts and storms. We address these gaps by focusing on flood-related political unrest between 2015 and 2018 in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Drawing on data from the Dartmouth Flood Observatory (DFO) and Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED), we find that flood-related political unrest occurs within two months after 24% of the 92 large flooding events recorded in our sample. Subsequently, a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) shows that the simultaneous presence of a large population, a democratic regime, and either the exclusion of ethnic groups from political power or a heavy impact of the flood is an important scope condition for the onset of flood-related political unrest. This indicates that disaster–conflict links are by no means deterministic. Rather, they are contingent on complex interactions between multiple contextual factors.