Human Rights Shaming Through INGOs and Foreign Aid Delivery

Dietrich, Simone; Murdie, Amanda

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2641766

Cited by 6 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 48 publications

(29 reference statements)

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“…The first form of international action to curb human rights abuses consists of multilateral action by intergovernmental organizations-most notably the United Nations-through the 4. Barry, Clay, and Flynn 2013;Dietrich and Murdie 2017;Hafner-Burton 2008;Keck and Sikkink 1998;Lebovic and Voeten 2009;Murdie and Bhasin 2011;Murdie and Peksen 2014;Peksen, Peterson, and Drury 2014;Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999. use of international human rights law. An extensive literature analyzes when and why states ratify human rights agreements 5 and the conditions under which states comply with human rights agreements they ratify.…”

Section: The Study Of Human Rights Diplomacymentioning

confidence: 99%

Making Sense of Human Rights Diplomacy: Evidence from a US Campaign to Free Political Prisoners

Myrick¹,

Weinstein²

2021

Int Org

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Scholarship on human rights diplomacy (HRD)—efforts by government officials to engage publicly and privately with their foreign counterparts—often focuses on actions taken to “name and shame” target countries because private diplomatic activities are unobservable. To understand how HRD works in practice, we explore a campaign coordinated by the US government to free twenty female political prisoners. We compare release rates of the featured women to two comparable groups: a longer list of women considered by the State Department for the campaign; and other women imprisoned simultaneously in countries targeted by the campaign. Both approaches suggest that the campaign was highly effective. We consider two possible mechanisms through which expressive public HRD works: by imposing reputational costs and by mobilizing foreign actors. However, in-depth interviews with US officials and an analysis of media coverage find little evidence of these mechanisms. Instead, we argue that public pressure resolved deadlock within the foreign policy bureaucracy, enabling private diplomacy and specific inducements to secure the release of political prisoners. Entrepreneurial bureaucrats leveraged the spotlight on human rights abuses to overcome competing equities that prevent government-led coercive diplomacy on these issues. Our research highlights the importance of understanding the intersection of public and private diplomacy before drawing inferences about the effectiveness of HRD.

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Section: The Study Of Human Rights Diplomacymentioning

confidence: 99%

Making Sense of Human Rights Diplomacy: Evidence from a US Campaign to Free Political Prisoners

Myrick¹,

Weinstein²

2021

Int Org

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“…Governments likely anticipate that CSOs attract international attention to human rights abuses, which may lead to reputational costs and sanctions (Barry, Clay and Finn 2012;Dietrich and Murdie 2017;Peterson, Murdie and Asal 2016;Woo and Murdie 2017). To avoid negative repercussions, repressive governments restrict CSO activities in order to silence their internal and international critics (Bakke, Mitchell and Smidt forthcoming;Carothers and Brechenmacher 2014).…”

Section: States Civil Society and Transnational Advocacymentioning

confidence: 99%

Silencing Their Critics: How Government Restrictions Against Civil Society Affect International ‘Naming and Shaming’

Smidt

Perera

Mitchell

et al. 2020

Brit. J. Polit. Sci.

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International 'naming and shaming' campaigns rely on domestic civil society organizations (CSOs) for information on local human rights conditions. To stop this flow of information, some governments restrict CSOs, for example by limiting their access to funding. Do such restrictions reduce international naming and shaming campaigns that rely on information from domestic CSOs? This article argues that on the one hand, restrictions may reduce CSOs' ability and motives to monitor local abuses. On the other hand, these organizations may mobilize against restrictions and find new ways of delivering information on human rights violations to international publics. Using a cross-national dataset and in-depth evidence from Egypt, the study finds that low numbers of restrictions trigger shaming by international non-governmental organizations. Yet once governments impose multiple types of restrictions, it becomes harder for CSOs to adapt, resulting in fewer international shaming campaigns.'Naming and shaming' by international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) such as Amnesty International requires information on local human rights violations. 1 Civil society organizations (CSOs) that monitor government behavior locally provide this information (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005;Keck and Sikkink 1998;Krain 2012;Meernik et al. 2012;Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999;Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 2013). 2 In response, some governments have imposed an increasing number and variety of restrictions on CSOs operating in their territory, including funding restrictions, arbitrary arrests and travel obstructions (UN Human Rights Council 2016). But what impact do these restrictions have on international naming and shaming campaigns? We investigate this question by examining how government-imposed restrictions influence CSOs' ability and motivation to monitor, mobilize and report about human rights abuses and, subsequently, affect international shaming campaigns.We argue that government-imposed restrictions have a curvilinear effect on international shaming campaigns. CSOs can withstand or adapt to lower numbers of restrictions, which may motivate them to reach out to international allies and boost international shaming campaigns. However, as the number of types of restrictions on the organization and its staff increases, © Cambridge University Press 2020. 1 International naming and shaming efforts seek to bring attention to and condemn human rights abuses by specific governments. 2 We define CSOs as formal organizations that are not part of the government or the for-profit sector, and which monitor government behavior and advocate for social or policy change. CSOs include domestic organizations as well as local branches of international organizations, such as the local chapter of Amnesty International.

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“…Faye and Niehaus () also find that major donors use foreign aid to influence elections in recipient countries in favor of their preferred political parties and leaders. Likewise, Dietrich and Murdie (:100) find that upon learning about reported cases of human rights abuse, major power donors do not necessarily bypass the recipient government states because doing so would be in conflict with their broader geostrategic or economic goals. Minor powers, on the other hand, given their limited influence in world affairs, place heavy emphasis on human rights while formulating aid polices and utilize nonstate actors for aid delivery in rights‐abusing states.…”

Section: Power Politics and Aid Allocationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…I also control for recipient states’ human rights records. Donors prefer to provide aid through nonstate actors in rights‐violating states, as shown by Dietrich and Murdie, ). I include Recipient physical integrity rights score from the CIRI Human Rights Project, which ranges from 0 to 8.…”

Section: Data and Research Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Power Politics and Foreign Aid Delivery Tactics

Adhikari

2019

Social Science Quarterly

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Objective This article explores the influence of aid recipient countries’ U.N. General Assembly voting on the amount of government‐to‐government economic assistance they receive from donor countries. I argue that major power donor states are swayed by recipient states’ voting records, while minor donors do not take U.N. General Assembly voting into consideration while formulating their aid policies. Method To explore the relationship, I utilize newly available, disaggregated foreign aid data. Result I find considerable empirical support for the assertion that dissimilar voting in the U.N. General Assembly results in less government‐to‐government aid from major power donors but has no effects on aid provided by minor power donors. Conclusion The findings show that foreign aid policies are based on donor countries’ position in the international system, where major power donors base their aid decisions mostly on strategic goals; minor power donors, on the other hand, prioritize recipient needs while formulating their foreign aid policies.

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Human Rights Shaming Through INGOs and Foreign Aid Delivery

Cited by 6 publications

References 48 publications

Making Sense of Human Rights Diplomacy: Evidence from a US Campaign to Free Political Prisoners

Making Sense of Human Rights Diplomacy: Evidence from a US Campaign to Free Political Prisoners

Silencing Their Critics: How Government Restrictions Against Civil Society Affect International ‘Naming and Shaming’

Power Politics and Foreign Aid Delivery Tactics

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