Human Abilities and Dynamic Modalities

“…It is a well known thesis of Kenny's, developed in [28] and [29], that the logic of ability cannot be formalized using the techniques of modal logic. Following von Wright in describing the 'can' of ability as a dynamic modality, Kenny puts the point by writing that "ability is not any kind of possibility; ... dynamic modality is not a modality" [29, p. 226].…”

Section: Kenny's Objectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The deliberative stit: A study of action, omission, ability, and obligation

1995

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“…Thus the only necessary conclusion warranted by the major premiss is that the agent will (attempt to) initiate action (or 'set himself to do' in von Wright's terminology). This in turn underscores the central significance of the issues of 'ability' (e.g., Kenny 1976) and 'trying' (e.g., Gorr 1979;Hornsby 1980). Third, the knowledge that an individual intends to achieve a goal does not allow prediction of the specific action or sequence of actions that will be initiated.…”

Section: The Nature Of Practical Necessitymentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Nature and Sources of Practical Necessity

Smith¹

1980

Philosophy of the Social Sciences

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EducationHistorians of our age will certainly emphasize the recent unprecedented efflorescence of thought in the philosophy of science. The development of this thought can be divided into two distinct phases. The first phase centred on the refutation of the foundationalist claims of the logical positivists and was grounded in analyses of the nature of thought, language and scientific practice (especially: Polanyi 1958;Feyerabend 1962;Kuhn 1962; and Toulmin 1972). The second and continuing phase centres on the development of alternatives to the logical positivist model of science and includes the serious reconsideration of methodological pluralism in the scientific explanation and prediction of at least some aspects of human behaviour. One of the most radical and ambitious alternatives is that proposed by von Wright (1971Wright ( , 1976a. In direct contrast to the positivist position, von Wright has outlined an explanatory model for history and the social sciences which stresses such concepts as choice, action, intentionality, teleology, meaning, and practical reasoning. The general purpose of this paper is to extend the development of that model. The core of von Wright's position may be briefly summarized as follows. Following in the general tradition of action theory, von Wright sees man as a powerful generative mechanism, an organism which is able to act, to do things. He therefore recognizes a fundamental division of human behaviour into at least two polar categories. Movements are habitual, unreflected, conditioned and therefore essentially reactive behaviours, governed by nomic necessity and thus most amenable to lawful explanation. Actions are intentional, reflected (or at least conscious), planned and therefore essentially purposive behaviours, governed by practical reasoning and (at least on some occasions) practical necessity, and thus most amenable to teleological or intentionalist explanations.More specifically, actions are conceived as having both an inner and an outer aspect. The inner aspect consists of the agent's intention; the outer aspect is complex, consisting of as many as three types of phases '.

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Human Abilities and Dynamic Modalities

Cited by 61 publications

References 1 publication

Free choice and distribution over disjunction: the case of free choice ability

Free choice and distribution over disjunction: the case of free choice ability

The deliberative stit: A study of action, omission, ability, and obligation

On the Nature and Sources of Practical Necessity

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