On the Nature and Sources of Practical Necessity

Abstract

EducationHistorians of our age will certainly emphasize the recent unprecedented efflorescence of thought in the philosophy of science. The development of this thought can be divided into two distinct phases. The first phase centred on the refutation of the foundationalist claims of the logical positivists and was grounded in analyses of the nature of thought, language and scientific practice (especially: Polanyi 1958;Feyerabend 1962;Kuhn 1962; and Toulmin 1972). The second and continuing phase centres on the development of alternatives to the logical positivist model of science and includes the serious reconsideration of methodological pluralism in the scientific explanation and prediction of at least some aspects of human behaviour. One of the most radical and ambitious alternatives is that proposed by von Wright (1971Wright ( , 1976a. In direct contrast to the positivist position, von Wright has outlined an explanatory model for history and the social sciences which stresses such concepts as choice, action, intentionality, teleology, meaning, and practical reasoning. The general purpose of this paper is to extend the development of that model. The core of von Wright's position may be briefly summarized as follows. Following in the general tradition of action theory, von Wright sees man as a powerful generative mechanism, an organism which is able to act, to do things. He therefore recognizes a fundamental division of human behaviour into at least two polar categories. Movements are habitual, unreflected, conditioned and therefore essentially reactive behaviours, governed by nomic necessity and thus most amenable to lawful explanation. Actions are intentional, reflected (or at least conscious), planned and therefore essentially purposive behaviours, governed by practical reasoning and (at least on some occasions) practical necessity, and thus most amenable to teleological or intentionalist explanations.More specifically, actions are conceived as having both an inner and an outer aspect. The inner aspect consists of the agent's intention; the outer aspect is complex, consisting of as many as three types of phases '.

Diversity and order in communication theory: The uses of philosophical analysis

“…So, for example, Cronen and Davis (1978) were able to claim primacy for their "open systems view" because of its supposed ability to encompass all three forms of necessity. A further difficulty is that the definition of practical necessity offered by Cushman and Pearce appears to be far too narrow (Smith, 1980). Cushman's analysis (1977) is much more subtle and complex.…”

“…385-95). Although productive of relatively little research, the relation of practical necessity to communication has been the subject of extensive theoretical and methodological discussion (see especially : Cushman, 1977;Cushman & Pearce, 1977a, 1977bAdler, 1978;Smith, 1980Smith, , 1983Shimanoff, 1980;Sanders & Cushman, 1984). For present purposes, suffice it to say that the identification of a form of necessity in human action secures at least the possibility of developing a fully scientific approach within the naturalistic style.…”