How two share two tasks: evidence of a social psychological refractory period effect

Liepelt, Roman; Prinz, Wolfgang

doi:10.1007/s00221-011-2703-2

Cited by 23 publications

(26 citation statements)

References 21 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Previous research on single subjects has enormously improved our understanding of how perception and action are linked (i.e., by sharing common representations), how individuals select task-relevant information, predict upcoming actions, and integrate predicted effects of one's own and others' actions (Wilson and Knoblich, 2005). However, when and to what extent individuals mentally represent their own and others' actions is currently a matter of debate in cognitive science (Liepelt and Prinz, 2011; Guagnano et al, 2013; Welsh et al, 2013a,b). …”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The joint Simon effect depends on perceived agency, but not intentionality, of the alternative action

Stenzel¹,

Dolk

Colzato

et al. 2014

Front. Hum. Neurosci.

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

A co-actor's intentionality has been suggested to be a key modulating factor for joint action effects like the joint Simon effect (JSE). However, in previous studies intentionality has often been confounded with agency defined as perceiving the initiator of an action as being the causal source of the action. The aim of the present study was to disentangle the role of agency and intentionality as modulating factors of the JSE. In Experiment 1, participants performed a joint go/nogo Simon task next to a co-actor who either intentionally controlled a response button with own finger movements (agency+/intentionality+) or who passively placed the hand on a response button that moved up and down on its own as triggered by computer signals (agency−/intentionality−). In Experiment 2, we included a condition in which participants believed that the co-actor intentionally controlled the response button with a Brain-Computer Interface (BCI) while placing the response finger clearly besides the response button, so that the causal relationship between agent and action effect was perceptually disrupted (agency−/intentionality+). As a control condition, the response button was computer controlled while the co-actor placed the response finger besides the response button (agency−/intentionality−). Experiment 1 showed that the JSE is present with an intentional co-actor and causality between co-actor and action effect, but absent with an unintentional co-actor and a lack of causality between co-actor and action effect. Experiment 2 showed that the JSE is absent with an intentional co-actor, but no causality between co-actor and action effect. Our findings indicate an important role of the co-actor's agency for the JSE. They also suggest that the attribution of agency has a strong perceptual basis.

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The joint Simon effect depends on perceived agency, but not intentionality, of the alternative action

Stenzel¹,

Dolk

Colzato

et al. 2014

Front. Hum. Neurosci.

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Indeed, joint action coordination in a social version of the dual-task paradigm (Liepelt and Prinz, 2011) induces bottleneck-like processing when two individuals share two complex and relatively independent number magnitude tasks. Participants had to indicate whether two numbers (1–4 and 6–9) appearing one above the other were smaller or larger than five.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…When the instructions prioritized Task 1 processing reaction times of Person 2 (Task 2) mimicked the standard PRP effect typically observed when one person has to perform both tasks simultaneously. Because reaction times for Person 2 also increased with decreasing SOA (social PRP effect), Liepelt and Prinz (2011) interpreted this finding as evidence for a strategic task monitoring effect that is related to the given task requirements (Meyer and Kieras, 1997b). …”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Aiming to answer these two questions, we combined an automatic imitation paradigm (Brass et al, 2000) and a social dual-task paradigm (Liepelt and Prinz, 2011). For the dual-task, we used an automatic imitation task as Task 1 and a two-choice number task as Task 2.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…If the social PRP effect (Liepelt and Prinz, 2011) is due to strategic action effect monitoring, one would predict an increase of reaction times for Task 2 (Person 2) in the joint condition when using a fixed task order and a priority instruction on Task 1 processing. This effect should be larger than in the individual condition where no action effect monitoring is supposed to take place.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Specifying social cognitive processes with a social dual-task paradigm

Liepelt¹,

Stenzel²,

Lappe³

2012

Front. Hum. Neurosci.

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Automatic imitation tasks measuring motor priming effects showed that we directly map observed actions of other agents onto our own motor repertoire (direct matching). A recent joint action study using a social dual-task paradigm provided evidence for task monitoring. In the present study, we aimed to test (a) if automatic imitation is disturbed during joint action and (b) if task monitoring is content or time dependent. We used a social dual-task that was made of an automatic imitation task (Person 1: Task 1) and a two-choice number task (Person 2: Task 2). Each participant performed one of the two tasks, which were given with a variable stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA), in an individual and a joint condition. We found a regular motor priming effect in individual and joint conditions. Under joint conditions, we replicated the previous finding of an increase of reaction times for Person 2 with decreasing SOA. The latter effect was not related to the specific responses performed by both persons. Further, we did not find evidence for a representation of the other's specific S-R mappings. Our findings suggest that (a) automatic imitation is not disturbed during joint action and (b) task monitoring is time dependent.

show abstract

Synchrony effect on joint attention

et al. 2017

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Research on joint attention has demonstrated that individuals are sensitive to a coactor's attentional relation to jointly attended stimuli. Within a chronobiological approach, a study was conducted to assess whether the presence of joint attention, as measured by the joint Navon effect, was influenced by the synchrony effect. Pairs of participants sitting next to each other were required to respond to the identity letters in a go/no-go Navon task. The joint Navon task was performed by morning, intermediate and evening types (81 pairs) at different times of day (09:00-10:00; 13:00-14:00; 17:00-18:00). The joint Navon effect on task performance was highlighted at the optimal time of day (in the morning for morning types, in the early afternoon for intermediate types and in the evening for evening types), but it disappeared or decreased at the non-optimal time of day, with the exception of evening types. The results demonstrated that joint attention was affected by the synchrony effect.

show abstract

How two share two tasks: evidence of a social psychological refractory period effect

Cited by 23 publications

References 21 publications

The joint Simon effect depends on perceived agency, but not intentionality, of the alternative action

The joint Simon effect depends on perceived agency, but not intentionality, of the alternative action

Specifying social cognitive processes with a social dual-task paradigm

Synchrony effect on joint attention

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About