2005
DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2004.07.017
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How trade politics affect invasive species control

Abstract: Trade has become the main mode of transport for many invasive species including diseases and agricultural pests. Most species are brought to their new homes unintentionally, which constitute a market failure rooted in international trade. Unless it is practical to drive invasion risk to zero, the external costs may justify a tariff. In this paper we analyze the political process likely to govern the formation of tariffs so justified, using a straightforward incorporation of an invasive species externality into… Show more

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Cited by 71 publications
(63 citation statements)
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“…On one hand, trade is one of the major causes of species invasions (Crosby 1986, Nentwig 2007. On the other hand, species invasions have led to feedbacks including restrictions and inspections of traded goods and products, with calls for stronger measures such as tradable permit programs (Horan and Lupi 2005) and invasive species tariffs (Margolis et al 2005) in the future.…”
Section: Conceptual Framework Of Telecouplings and Sustainabilitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…On one hand, trade is one of the major causes of species invasions (Crosby 1986, Nentwig 2007. On the other hand, species invasions have led to feedbacks including restrictions and inspections of traded goods and products, with calls for stronger measures such as tradable permit programs (Horan and Lupi 2005) and invasive species tariffs (Margolis et al 2005) in the future.…”
Section: Conceptual Framework Of Telecouplings and Sustainabilitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Similarly, Mérel and Carter (2008) report that tariffs combined with fines on commodities found to be infested outperform tariffs alone, because the additional fines incentivize abatement by exporters. Nonetheless, tariffs addressing invasion risk may be challenged politically by the difficulties in differentiating tariffs aimed at protectionism (i.e., meant to protect domestic producers from cheap imports) from those actually aimed at addressing invasion risk (Margolis et al 2005). Preventing forest invasions also can be achieved by reducing pest loads on imported goods through preborder interventions.…”
Section: Invasion Preventionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…McAusland and Costello (2004) present a model of contaminated imports and examine the optimal mix of policies, including import tariffs and border inspections. Margolis, Shogren, and Fischer (2005) incorporate political economy into a model of Pigouvian tariffs and a working paper by Margolis and Shogren (2007) includes political economy in a model of Pigouvian tariffs, border inspections, and fines. Merel and Carter (2008) extend the McAusland and Costello (2004) model to allow for a two-part tariff that includes a fine on detected contaminated imports.…”
Section: Prior Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…The first federal quarantine was implemented in 1879 when US customs collectors imposed a ninety day quarantine on imports of European cattle (Kreith and Golino 2003). against foreign pests and diseases from attempts to protect domestic producers from import competition. Distinguishing these two motives requires knowledge of expected damages as well as an assessment of risk preferences and regulatory approaches to risk which often vary across nations and regulatory agencies (Sumner and Tangermann 2002;Margolis, Shogren, and Fischer 2005). In addition, heterogeneity in standards and a lack of systematic data make quantification of the restrictiveness of import standards difficult (Beghin 2008;Beghin and Bureau 2001).…”
Section: Introduction and Policy Backgroundmentioning
confidence: 99%
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