How to Coordinate Value Generation in Service Networks

Abstract

The authors present a mathematical model for Service Value Networks (SVNs) describing the main components and their interdependencies. To coordinate distributed activities in SVNs, they present a scalable multidimensional auction mechanism that enables the allocation and pricing of complex services. The mechanism and its bidding language support the multidimensional description of QoS attributes, their (semantic) aggregation and enforcement. It is analytically shown that the mechanism is incentive compatible with respect to all dimensions of service providers' bids, i.e. truth-revelation of QoS attributes and private valuations is an equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies. Based on these results, the authors numerically analyze strategic behavior of participating service providers regarding possible collusion strategies.

Efficient QoS Aggregation in Service Value Networks

“…Representatives for the min or max function are the throughput of a service or the encryption level. In the winner determination problem, as it occurs in multiattributive auctions [19] or in the complex service auction [20], the welfare or utility maximizing configuration or path has to be calculated. In optimization scenarios for QoS-aware composition of Web services [18] or custom cloud services [21], the challenge is to find the optimal complex service configurations with respect to user-defined QoS preferences.…”

“…In a more graph oriented approach, as it is suitable for finding the best offer in a Service Value Network, graph algorithms can be used to find the best offer by calculating the optimal path through the network. [20] propose the use of the Dijkstra algorithm [22] to compute the shortest path within polynomial time complexity, however, this can only be achieved under the assumption of additive and monotone aggregation operations, as Dijkstra relies on the Bellman property [23]. This however hinders the inclusion of any QoS attribute other than the ones that fall into the class of additive aggregation functions (cf.…”

A multi-attribute service portfolio design problem

“…Typically, cloud service utility is modeled as linear multiattributive utility functions over non-functional quality attributes which yield a user's willingness to pay for the product [6], [15], [16]. In this paper we suggest an alternative approach.…”

Co-Opetitive Contracting in Service Value Networks

“…For an efficient allocation of single services in SVNs we consult a special form of the famous Vickrey auction as introduced in mechanism design literature applied to Service Value Networks [1], [27]: Each service provider places a price bid p ij for each incoming edge from service i of its service j that represents its valuation for the service being allocated. The auctioneer allocates a path through the network that generates the highest utility U * .…”