How to Change Epistemological Beliefs? Effects of Scientific Controversies, Epistemological Sensitization, and Critical Thinking Instructions on Epistemological Change

Abstract

The present study investigates the combination of an epistemological sensitization and two different critical thinking instructions, i.e., the general and infusion approach, on epistemological change induced by the presentation of resolvable, scientific controversies. In a randomized study, we tested the hypothesis that the presentation of resolvable controversies generally reduces absolutism and multiplicism and increases evaluativism. We assume that these effects are strongest when the controversies are presented with an epistemological sensitization and the infusion approach. The results indicate an increase in absolutism when using the general approach without an epistemological sensitization. With an epistemological sensitization, there is only an increase in absolutism when the infusion approach is used. Concerning multiplicism, there is a reduction in all conditions, but the reduction is more effective without an epistemological sensitization. The general approach yields a larger increase in evaluativism without an epistemological sensitization. However, with sensitization, only the infusion approach increases evaluativism. Finally, an argumentation task revealed that the desired level of an evaluativist argumentation seems only to emerge without an epistemological sensitization in combination with the infusion approach. In sum, the results show that there is no general way to reduce absolutism and multiplicism and increase evaluativism.

Profiles of epistemological beliefs, knowledge about explanation norms, and explanation skills: Changes after an intervention

“…Intuitively, the expectation is that individuals with higher levels of declarative knowledge about explanations should have better explanation skills. Given the mutual development of epistemological beliefs, explanation skills, and declarative knowledge about explanations during the enculturation in the domain (Klopp & Stark, 2016;Palmer & Marra, 2008), this result seems to imply that epistemological beliefs are primarily important for the development of explanation skills but not for the declarative knowledge about the structure and norms of explanations. The skilled explainers may apply the standards resulting from their epistemological beliefs to explanations.…”

Profiles of epistemological beliefs, knowledge about explanation norms, and explanation skills: changes after an intervention

“…Intuitively, the expectation is that individuals with higher levels of declarative knowledge about explanations should have better explanation skills. Given the mutual development of epistemological beliefs, explanation skills, and declarative knowledge about explanations during the enculturation in the domain (Palmer and Marra, 2008;Klopp and Stark, 2016), this result seems to imply that epistemological beliefs are primarily important for the development of explanation skills but not for the declarative knowledge about the structure and norms of explanations. The skilled explainers may apply the standards resulting from their epistemological beliefs to explanations.…”