How to build a baby: II. Conceptual primitives.

Abstract

A mechanism of perceptual analysis by which infants derive meaning from perceptual activity is described. Infants use this mechanism to redescribe perceptual information into image-schematic format. Image-schemas create conceptual structure from the spatial structure of objects and their movements, resulting in notions such as animacy, inanimacy, agency, and containment. These earliest meanings are nonpropositional, analogical representations grounded in the perceptual world of the infant. In contrast with most perceptual processing, which is not analyzed in this fashion, redescription into image-schematic format simplifies perceptual information and makes it potentially accessible for purposes of concept formation and thought. In addition to enabling preverbal thought, image-schemas provide a foundation for language acquisition by creating an interface between the continuous processes of perception and the discrete nature of language.

Understanding spatial relations: Flexible infants, lexical adults

“…Examples of universal primitives that have been suggested include containment, support, contact, opening and closing, horizontality, verticality, and path (e.g., Bloom et al, 1985;Clark, E., 1973;Nelson, 1974;Sinha, Thorseng, Hayashi, & Plunkett, 1994;Talmy, 1985). Many of these are similar to the image schemas underlying language understanding discussed by cognitive linguists (e.g., Lakoff, 1987;Johnson, 1987) and proposed by Mandler (1992) as developing early in infancy. Such conceptual primitives, whether innate or learned, would help constrain the possible meanings of spatial terms, making language learning easier for the child.…”

Infants' use of object parts in early categorization.

“…However, as argued earlier, there is little evidence that such properties guide taxonomic categorization. Indeed, if knowledge of nonobvious properties is in place early in infancy, as Mandler ( 1992Mandler ( , 1993 argued, it follows that objects related by movement (e.g., self-starting) should be grouped whether or not they share the same parts. The infant should know, for example, that all animals travel through space in a similar way, that they are self-starting and do not move linearly, and that vehicles move in a different manner.…”

Color–function categories that prime infants to use color information in an object individuation task

“…For example, from an early age, infants possess perceptual categories that they use to help make sense of a wide range of perceptual stimuli, from speech sounds to color arrays (e.g., Aslin, Jusczyk, & Pisoni, 1998;Bornstein et al, 1976;Franklin & Davies, 2004). Infants also possess more meaningful or conceptual categories (Mandler, 1992), such as the distinction between kinds of objects (animate vs. inanimate or natural kinds vs. artifacts) or kinds of mechanical interactions (containment vs. support or inert vs. self-propelled), that allow them to interpret and make predictions about the outcome of physical and social events (e.g., Baillargeon, 1998Baillargeon, , 2004Leslie, 1994;Meltzoff & Moore, 1995;Premack, 1990;Spelke & Woodward, 1995). In adults, these are often referred to as natural categories (Ross & Murphy, 1999) and a great deal of effort has been placed on understanding how adults and children use these categories to draw inferences about the properties an object will possess or the purpose/function of an object (Gelman & Coley, 1990;Gelman & Koenig, 2003;Gelman & Markman, 1986;Kalish & Gelman, 1992;Lopez, Atran, Coley, Medin, & Smith, 1997;Malt, Ross, & Murphy, 1995;Malt & Smith, 1984;Markman, 1989;Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976;Ross & Murphy, 1999).…”