Abstract:While it has long been assumed that smaller communities are more prone to particularistic politics, the relationship between state size and clientelism remains strongly undertheorized. Departing from the assumption that face-to-face contacts, overlapping role relations, stronger monitoring mechanisms, and the enhanced power of single votes contribute to the emergence of patron–client linkages, this article provides an in-depth case study of clientelism in Malta, the smallest member state of the European Union.… Show more
“…Such combination exists in Malta and Spain, both countries with high corruption values in our dataset. Malta exemplifies the pervasive impact (beyond party politics) of clientelism which remains a ubiquitous feature of that system (Mitchell, 2002;Veenendaal, 2019). Spain similarly has an embedded and multi-faceted corruption challenge which renders social capital far less potent than in northern European countries (Villoria et al, 2013).…”
“…Such combination exists in Malta and Spain, both countries with high corruption values in our dataset. Malta exemplifies the pervasive impact (beyond party politics) of clientelism which remains a ubiquitous feature of that system (Mitchell, 2002;Veenendaal, 2019). Spain similarly has an embedded and multi-faceted corruption challenge which renders social capital far less potent than in northern European countries (Villoria et al, 2013).…”
“…Access to state services critically depends on which politician or political party is in power, magnifying their personal significance. One consequence is very high levels of voter turnout (over 95 per cent of registered voters participating in elections) despite the absence of compulsory voting (Hirczy 1995; Veenendaal 2019). As one Maltese politician explained, few can escape political tribalism, and independent or neutral positions are almost impossible to maintain:Everything here is a zero‐sum game.…”
Section: The Core Executive and Small Statesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“… Fourteen from Liechtenstein (see Veenendaal 2015), 13 from St Kitts‐Nevis (see Veenendaal 2014), 22 from Malta (see Veenendaal 2019), 21 from Suriname (see Veenendaal 2020); 27 from Samoa (see Corbett and Ng Shiu 2014) and 15 from Solomon Islands (see Corbett and Wood 2013; Corbett 2015a). …”
This article interrogates three key arguments derived from the functional approach to studying the core executive: (1) that coordination is the primary problem that confronts executive decision‐makers; (2) that improved coordination will lead to better governance; and (3) that linkage problems dissipate as policy systems consolidate. Drawing on the experience of hitherto understudied small states, including 112 interviews with political elites, we show how the effects of country size create governance challenges in the form of leader dominance, patronage systems and capacity constraints. Our findings support the call to broaden the focus of functional analysis beyond its traditional emphasis on coordination. For scholars of small states we synthesize existing empirical findings and provide a theoretical justification for future work using an adaptation of the core executive approach.
“…Last but not least is the observation that the closeness between citizens and politicians frequently translates into conflicts of interest, patron-client linkages, and corruption (Sutton, 2007). Whereas patron-client linkages can be observed in both large and small societies, for a number of reasons smallness can not only be seen as conducive to clientelism, but can also be assumed to modify the manifestation of clientelistic relationships in a number of ways (Crespin & Finocchiaro, 2013;Veenendaal, 2019). In the first place, while direct and unfettered access to politicians is theorized to enhance representation and responsiveness, it also stimulates particularistic exchanges between citizens and public officials.…”
Section: Informal Politics In Small Statesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Politicians' electoral dependence on a relatively small number of votes also strengthens the position of clients vis-à-vis their patrons, further raising these pressures. While the literature on clientelism tends to portray clients as occupying a weak and dependent position vis-à-vis their patrons, in small societies the situation may be reversed (Veenendaal, 2019). Finally, as a result of social intimacy, both clients and patrons have additional opportunities to monitor the actions and behavior of their counterparts, and can therefore control to what extent clientelistic obligations are actually met (cf.…”
Section: Informal Politics In Small Statesmentioning
Pointing to a number of informal dynamics in small societies that are supposed to enhance cooperation and consensus, traditional studies on power-sharing posit that small states are 'most likely' candidates for stable, multiethnic democracy. These assumptions are, however, challenged by the case study literature on small states which highlights a variety of informal patterns that undermine democratic governance. Addressing this contradiction, the present paper provides an in-depth analysis of power-sharing politics in Suriname, a small, culturally heterogeneous country in South America that initially figured as a prominent case in consociational theory. The analysis reveals that the smallness of Suriname strongly affects and shapes the nature of democracy in the country. On the one hand, clientelism ensures that members of each ethnic group included in power-sharing arrangements have access to state resources and services, thus providing a large measure of political stability. On the other hand, clientelism undermines the functioning of multiethnic democracy by a host of negative side effects, among which economic and social dependency of citizens, executive dominance and authoritarian politics, endemic corruption that goes largely unpunished, and state predation by elites. The upshot is that whereas power-sharing arrangements in small societies might indeed be facilitated by a small population size, there is a heavy price to pay in terms of the quality of democracy.
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