Does Smallness Enhance Power-Sharing? Explaining Suriname’s Multiethnic Democracy

Abstract

Pointing to a number of informal dynamics in small societies that are supposed to enhance cooperation and consensus, traditional studies on power-sharing posit that small states are 'most likely' candidates for stable, multiethnic democracy. These assumptions are, however, challenged by the case study literature on small states which highlights a variety of informal patterns that undermine democratic governance. Addressing this contradiction, the present paper provides an in-depth analysis of power-sharing politics in Suriname, a small, culturally heterogeneous country in South America that initially figured as a prominent case in consociational theory. The analysis reveals that the smallness of Suriname strongly affects and shapes the nature of democracy in the country. On the one hand, clientelism ensures that members of each ethnic group included in power-sharing arrangements have access to state resources and services, thus providing a large measure of political stability. On the other hand, clientelism undermines the functioning of multiethnic democracy by a host of negative side effects, among which economic and social dependency of citizens, executive dominance and authoritarian politics, endemic corruption that goes largely unpunished, and state predation by elites. The upshot is that whereas power-sharing arrangements in small societies might indeed be facilitated by a small population size, there is a heavy price to pay in terms of the quality of democracy.

Labor movements and party system development: Why does the Caribbean have stable two-party systems, but the Pacific does not?

“…In the case of Suriname, which is the most ethnically heterogeneous of all Caribbean countries, a multi-party system emerged in which three major parties catered to the country's dominant ethnic groups (Creoles, Hindostanis, and Javanese). Analogous to the Anglophone Caribbean countries, and reflecting the absence of meaningful ideological competition, in the run-up to independence these parties together formed a grand coalition that incorporated all major groups and interests in society (Veenendaal, 2019).…”

How population size affects power-sharing: a comparison of Nigeria and Suriname

“…In similar fashion, while Suriname has some degree of decentralisation, its districts and resorts remain quite powerless vis-à-vis the omnipotent national administration. As a consequence, the Surinamese tradition of power-sharing is not so much grounded in institutional rules, but rather stems from informal political practices and traditions, and in particular the personal relations between key politicians (Veenendaal, 2020).…”

“…As in other small states, politics in Suriname thus primarily focuses on personal connections rather than ideological convictions or programmatic concerns (Ramsoedh, 2018;Veenendaal, 2020). The main focus of political leaders is to make sure that their party and the ethnic group it represents retain access to state resources and services, meaning that the key aim of all political parties is to become part of the government.…”

The core executive and small states: Is coordination the primary challenge?

“…There is no space for that, and if you start behaving in a way that criticizes both political parties, for example, then you must be mad.The final two small states—Suriname and Solomon Islands—are ‘least likely’ cases for power concentration because they are fragmented or ‘deeply divided’ societies. Suriname is often considered a successful multicultural democracy, with five distinct ethnic groups competing peacefully in democratic elections (Veenendaal 2020). However, the main logic driving its multi‐ethnic coalitions is the desire to ensure that each ethnic group has access to the spoils of government, with political parties ‘colonizing’ the state to distribute public resources among their constituents (Ramsoedh 2016).…”

“…1 1 Fourteen from Liechtenstein (see Veenendaal 2015), 13 from St Kitts‐Nevis (see Veenendaal 2014), 22 from Malta (see Veenendaal 2019), 21 from Suriname (see Veenendaal 2020); 27 from Samoa (see Corbett and Ng Shiu 2014) and 15 from Solomon Islands (see Corbett and Wood 2013; Corbett 2015a). …”