How non-epistemic values can be epistemically beneficial in scientific classification

Ahn, Soohyun

doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2020.08.002

Cited by 6 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 37 publications

(30 reference statements)

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“…Which position is assumed by current codes of conduct? Here it is interesting to note that in the reviewed articles preserving RI is mentioned only as a reason in favor of the VFI (Ahn, 2020;Douglas, 2008;Resnik & Elliott, 2016.…”

Section: Implications For Research Integritymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Moreover, even this analysis may overstate the level of disagreement, since many authors holding different normative positions on the VLIs are nonetheless driven by similar concerns. Only 4 articles (Ahn, 2020;Bueter, 2015;de Melo-Martin & Intemann, 2016;Rottschaefer, 2003) of those not endorsing the VFI explicitly claim that non-epistemic values are epistemically beneficial. These articles claim that at least in some fields value-judgments are fundamental to accomplish the epistemic aims of science (Ahn, 2020;de Melo-Martin & Intemann, 2016;Rottschaefer, 2003), and that pluralism of values would benefit inquiry by providing more perspectives (Bueter, 2015).…”

Section: Implications For Scientific Expertise and Science-based Policymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Only 4 articles (Ahn, 2020;Bueter, 2015;de Melo-Martin & Intemann, 2016;Rottschaefer, 2003) of those not endorsing the VFI explicitly claim that non-epistemic values are epistemically beneficial. These articles claim that at least in some fields value-judgments are fundamental to accomplish the epistemic aims of science (Ahn, 2020;de Melo-Martin & Intemann, 2016;Rottschaefer, 2003), and that pluralism of values would benefit inquiry by providing more perspectives (Bueter, 2015). In this perspective, the weight of opinion shifts even more in favor of some of the key concerns underlying the VFI: virtually 14 sources endorse not using nonepistemic values for epistemic ends, whereas 4 do.…”

Section: Implications For Scientific Expertise and Science-based Policymentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

The Value-Free Ideal of Science: A Useful Fiction? A Review of Non-epistemic Reasons for the Research Integrity Community

2023

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Even if the "value-free ideal of science" (VFI) were an unattainable goal, one could ask: can it be a useful fiction, one that is beneficial for the research community and society? This question is particularly crucial for scholars and institutions concerned with research integrity (RI), as one cannot offer normative guidance to researchers without making some assumptions about what ideal scientific research looks like. Despite the insofar little interaction between scholars studying RI and those working on values in science, the overlap of topics and interests make collaboration between the two fields promising for understanding research and its ethics.Here, we identify-for the use of RI scholars-the non-epistemic reasons (societal, political, professional) for and against the VFI considered in the literature. All of these are concerned with the beneficial or detrimental consequences that endorsing the VFI would have on society, policymaking, or the scientific community, with some authors appealing to the same principles to argue for opposite positions. Though most of the reviewed articles do not endorse the VFI, it is generally agreed that some constraints have to be put on the use of non-epistemic values.Disagreement on the utility of the VFI lies both on the different epistemic-descriptive positions taken by different authors, and on the scarcity of relevant empirical studies. Engaging critically with the reasons here identified and more in general with the values in science debate will help the RI community decide whether the VFI should be included in future codes of conduct.

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Section: Implications For Research Integritymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Implications For Scientific Expertise and Science-based Policymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Implications For Scientific Expertise and Science-based Policymentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

The Value-Free Ideal of Science: A Useful Fiction? A Review of Non-epistemic Reasons for the Research Integrity Community

2023

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“…Reflecting on the heterogeneity of fruitful classifications in science and other domains, Ludwig (2018, 31) suggests "that attempts to formulate a general account of naturalness have become an obstacle to understanding classificatory practices." Challenging the association of natural kinds with value-free objectivity (Ahn, 2021), Brigandt (2022, 1) argues "that philosophers should stop using the term 'natural kinds,' as this label obscures the relevance of humans interests and the way in which many kinds are based on contingent social processes subject to human responsibility. "…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

From naturalness to materiality: reimagining philosophy of scientific classification

Ludwig

2023

Euro Jnl Phil Sci

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The notion of natural kinds has been widely criticized in philosophy of science but also appears indispensable for philosophical engagement with classificatory practices. Rather than addressing this tension through a new definition of “natural kind”, this article suggests materiality as a substitute for naturalness in philosophical debates about scientific classification. It is argued that a theory of material kinds provides an alternative and more inclusive entry point for analyzing classificatory practices, which is specified through an account of “restricted malleability” of materiality and further analyzed as (1) gradual, (2) multi-dimensional, (3) scalable, (4) interactive, and (5) purpose sensitive.

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The non-epistemic dimension, at last a key component in mainstream theoretical approaches to teaching the nature of science

García-Carmona

2024

Sci & Educ

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For many years, hegemonic approaches to teaching the nature of science (NOS) have focused mainly on understanding some epistemic (i.e., rational, or cognitive) aspects involved in the construction of science. So, aspects of a non-epistemic (i.e., non-rational, contextual, or extra-scientific) nature have been practically neglected in these predominant proposals for teaching NOS. However, those of us who advocate a more holistic NOS teaching, with a balanced integration of both epistemic and non-epistemic aspects of NOS, have reason to celebrate. The development of the family resemblance approach (FRA) to NOS, initially proposed by Irzik and Nola (2011, 2014), and then suitably adapted by Erduran and Dagher (2014) for science education, has cemented such a purpose in the current literature on NOS teaching research. But, like all scientific milestones, there are antecedents that, in some way, have also contributed to building the path that has brought us to this point. Therefore, it is fair to acknowledge them. Thus, the aim of this article is to provide a critical discussion of all of this and to make an explicit acknowledgement of some of these antecedents, such as the framework of the science-technology-society (STS) tradition, among others, without undermining the important role of the FRA in achieving the current predominant vision of holistic NOS teaching.

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How non-epistemic values can be epistemically beneficial in scientific classification

Cited by 6 publications

References 37 publications

The Value-Free Ideal of Science: A Useful Fiction? A Review of Non-epistemic Reasons for the Research Integrity Community

The Value-Free Ideal of Science: A Useful Fiction? A Review of Non-epistemic Reasons for the Research Integrity Community

From naturalness to materiality: reimagining philosophy of scientific classification

The non-epistemic dimension, at last a key component in mainstream theoretical approaches to teaching the nature of science

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