1999
DOI: 10.1016/s0165-4101(99)00007-5
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How much are differences in managerial ability worth?

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Cited by 198 publications
(104 citation statements)
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“…In our sensitivity analysis, however, good matches (bad match-dismissal) are positively (negatively) related to sales. The significance of sales is consistent with previous research, which suggests that matching is less important at larger firms (Bishop 1990) and that CEOs tend to be of higher ability at larger firms (Hayes and Schaefer 1999). When reestimating table 3, we find that the outside and dismissal dummy variables remain insignificant.…”
Section: B Sensitivity Analysissupporting
confidence: 88%
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“…In our sensitivity analysis, however, good matches (bad match-dismissal) are positively (negatively) related to sales. The significance of sales is consistent with previous research, which suggests that matching is less important at larger firms (Bishop 1990) and that CEOs tend to be of higher ability at larger firms (Hayes and Schaefer 1999). When reestimating table 3, we find that the outside and dismissal dummy variables remain insignificant.…”
Section: B Sensitivity Analysissupporting
confidence: 88%
“…According to Murphy, the executive employment contract often includes a guaranteed minimum increase in base salary over the subsequent 5-year period. Not surprisingly, we rarely observe pay cuts in the CEO labor market, suggesting that CEO compensation is downwardly rigid (Hayes and Schaefer 1999). The presence of downwardly rigid wages 3.…”
Section: Job Match Model and The Ceo Labor Marketmentioning
confidence: 77%
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“…Terviö (2008), using CEO pay as a proxy for their ability, calculates that, if we were to replace the CEOs of the 1,000 largest U.S. businesses with the lowest paid and presumably least able, their total capital value would fall by 0.13%-0.16% in 2004, or by 4.3%-5.3% in the long run, applying a 3% future discount rate (approximately the average of the Federal Reserve System's discount rate for 2004). Hayes and Schaefer (1999) find that share prices fall by 3%-5% when a (presumably more able) CEO quits for a better job, an effect of similar magnitude to Terviö's (2008). However, the applicability of the approach using share price movements is limited to large publicly quoted firms.…”
Section: Prior Literature and Our Studymentioning
confidence: 94%