How malleable are political‐economic institutions? The case of labour‐market decision‐making in British Columbia

Abstract

This article reviews two efforts to reform labour‐market decision‐making in British Columbia during the 1990s that were designed to increase the private sector's role in developing and administering education and training programs. The first effort was the British Columbia Labour Force Development Board, created in 1994 and closed in 1996; the second was the Industry Training and Apprenticeship Commission, launched in 1997 and still in operation at the time of writing. Each reform sought to foster cooperation among public‐ and private‐sector actors in the labour‐market field in “associational” arrangements. In so doing, the reforms ran counter to institutionally entrenched patterns of behaviour in B.C.‘s political economy, which favour conflict between business and labour and limited involvement of private‐sector actors in public‐sector labour‐market institutions. This article assesses the extent to which these institutional constraints precluded the success of these reforms. The evidence suggests that they did, and that political‐economic institutions are therefore a powerful and relatively rigid constraint on innovations of the associational type. Nevertheless, the article concludes that such reforms are more likely to succeed at the sectoral or local level, where these constraints are less compelling and where the forces that encourage associational reforms are particulary strong. Sommaire: Cet article passé en revue deux efforts de réforme de la prise de décisions concemant le marché du travail en Colombie‐Britannique au cours des années 1990 et qui visaient à augmenter le rôle du secteur privé dans I'elaboration et l'administra‐tion des programmes d'enseignement et de formation. Le premier de ces efforts fut le Conseil de développement de la main‐doeuvre de la Colombie‐Britannique, créé en 1994 et aboli en 1996; le deuxième fut la Commission d'apprentissage et de formation industriels, mise sur pied en 1997 et existant toujours à l'heure actuelles. Chacune de ces réformes visait à favoriser la collaboration entre les intervenants publics et privés du marché du travail, au moyen d'arrangements « associatifs «. Ce faisant, les réformes allaient à l'encontre des comportements institutionnellement ancrés dans I'économie politique de la C‐B., qui favorisent le conflit entre le patronat et les syndicates ainsi qu'une participation limitée des intervenants du secteur privé dans les institutions du marché du travail du secteur public. Cet article évaluée à quel point ces contraintes institutionnelles ont ernpiêché la réussite de ces réformes. Il semblerait effectivement qu'elles I'ont empêkhé. Les institutions politico‐économiques représen‐tent donc une contrainte rigide et puissante pour les innovations de type associatif. Néanmoins, on conclut que de telles réformes ont de meilleures chances de succé‐formes ont de meilleures chances de succès au niveau sedoriel ou local, où ces contraintes sont moindres et où les forces qui encouragent les réformes associatives sont particulièrement fortes.

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