How language does (and does not) relate to theory of mind: A longitudinal study of syntax, semantics, working memory and false belief

Abstract

Forty-four children (mean 3.8 years) were given three false belief, a working memory, and four language tasks (each designed to tap a different aspect of syntax or semantics), and were tested again 6 months later. Once the range of scores in the language and false belief tasks were equated, there was a bidirectional relation between language and theory of mind. There was no evidence for syntax playing a unique role in the contribution of language to theory of mind. No one measure of syntax or semantics was more likely than any other to predict later false belief. Nor was false belief related more to one aspect of later language (syntax vs. semantics) than another. Our data, taken with other findings, are consistent with the idea that both syntax and semantics contribute to false belief understanding. Working memory did not mediate the relation between language and theory of mind, nor did it facilitate later false belief.

Examination of script and non-script based narrative retellings in children with autism spectrum disorders

“…Nevertheless, a significant relationship was found between language and narrative coherence and cohesion, confirming that language is related in important ways to narrative production in children with ASD. Furthermore, the strong association found between ToM and language was not surprising, and corroborates previous research, which has established a dynamic relationship throughout development between these two constructs (e.g., Slade & Ruffman, 2005). …”

The Role of Language Games in Children's Understanding of Mental States: A Training Study

“…Although the direction of this relationship is still hotly debated (Milligan, Astington, & Dack, 2007) and the effect of language on theory of mind seems to be stronger than the other way around, recent findings support the hypothesis of a bidirectional relationship between theory of mind and language (Slade & Ruffman, 2005). In addition, different aspects of language (semantic, syntactic, and pragmatic) all seem to be related to theory of mind, although each of them plays a specific role (Antonietti, Liverta Sempio, & Marchetti, 2006).…”

How do use and comprehension of mental-state language relate to theory of mind in middle childhood?

“…Data from previous studies on theory-of-mind development in children suggest that language plays a key role in acquiring an understanding of mental states (Astington, 2001;Harris, de Rosnay, & Pons, 2005;Hughes, 2011;Hughes, Marks, Ensor, & Lecce, 2010;Lohman & Tomasello, 2003;Milligan, Astington, & Dack, 2007;Ruffman, Slade, Rowlandson, Rumsey, & Garnham, 2003;Slade & Ruffman, 2005). It is through language that children participate in social interaction, conversational exchanges, pretend play, story-telling and other activities fostering their ability to link manifest actions and behaviors with mental states that are inaccessible to direct observation (Nelson, 2005).…”