2019
DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2019.1668245
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How governments strategically time welfare state reform legislation: empirical evidence from five European countries

Abstract: Building on studies on the political business cycle, the literature on welfare state retrenchment has argued that governments which cut the welfare state try to avoid blame by implementing painful measures in the beginning of the mandate and expanding benefits as elections approach. In contrast to this linear relationship, we argue that governments often feel pressured to fulfill (mostly expansionary) campaign promises during the first months in office. Consequently, cutting right away is not what should be ex… Show more

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Cited by 22 publications
(10 citation statements)
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“…In such situations, blame-avoidance strategies are used to delegate, blur or shift responsibility for the decision-just in case that it turns out to have negative consequences (Hinterleitner 2017;Weaver 1986;Vis and Van Kersbergen 2007;König and Wenzelburger 2014;Hood 2011). This is true for unpopular welfare state cutbacks (Jensen et al 2018;Wenzelburger et al 2019;Vis 2009) as well as for decisions in the area of crime (Hinterleitner 2018). In fact, blame-avoidance behavior is a much more common phenomenon and can be expected to structure the public decisionmaking process in many cases, and especially when risky decisions are involved (Hood 2011).…”
Section: Algorithms and Decision-making In A Context Of Uncertainty And Fatal Consequencesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In such situations, blame-avoidance strategies are used to delegate, blur or shift responsibility for the decision-just in case that it turns out to have negative consequences (Hinterleitner 2017;Weaver 1986;Vis and Van Kersbergen 2007;König and Wenzelburger 2014;Hood 2011). This is true for unpopular welfare state cutbacks (Jensen et al 2018;Wenzelburger et al 2019;Vis 2009) as well as for decisions in the area of crime (Hinterleitner 2018). In fact, blame-avoidance behavior is a much more common phenomenon and can be expected to structure the public decisionmaking process in many cases, and especially when risky decisions are involved (Hood 2011).…”
Section: Algorithms and Decision-making In A Context Of Uncertainty And Fatal Consequencesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Timing has been acknowledged as an important instrument to exploit dynamics in public attention to politics and policy action (e.g., Becher & Christiansen 2015; Strobl et al 2019; Wenzelburger et al 2020). On the level of legislative action, parties could time cooperative behaviour in such a way that voters are less likely to perceive parties as too close.…”
Section: Theoretical Assumptions and Hypothesesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This is particularly the case in relation to understandings of the specific tools and instruments that governments actually use to maintain the legitimacy and function of key programmes. Where detailed work has been done, this is largely in relation, timing and the role that distribution of benefits and costs can play in avoiding blame and claiming credit (Nelson, 2016;Slothuus, 2007;Wenzelburger et al 2020) or a more general 'institutional capacity' to insulate decision-making from external pressure (Jacobs 2011). Comparatively less attention has been paid to procedure, and the ways in which procedural and substantive tools may interact in the longer-term management of complex social programmes.…”
Section: Policy Tools and The Welfare State In The Long Runmentioning
confidence: 99%