How effective is European merger control?

Duso, Tomaso; Gugler, Klaus; Yurtoğlu, B. Burçin

doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2011.04.003

Cited by 97 publications

(34 citation statements)

References 43 publications

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“…To …nd the risk-dominant equilibrium, we apply the tracing procedure as proposed by Harsanyi and Selten (1988). 15,16 The tracing procedure describes a process of converging expectations from the priors to the expectations implying one of the Nash equilibria;…”

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confidence: 99%

Technology adoption in markets with network effects: Theory and experimental evidence

Keser

Suleymanova

Wey

2012

Information Economics and Policy

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The working papers published in the Series constitute work in progress circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comments. Views expressed represent exclusively the authors' own opinions and do not necessarily reflect those of the editor. Terms of use: Documents in Technology Adoption in Markets withNetwork E¤ects: Theory and Experimental Evidence Claudia Keser y Irina Suleymanova z Christian Wey x October 2011 AbstractWe examine a technology adoption game with network e¤ects in which coordination on technology A and technology B constitute a Nash equilibrium. Coordination on technology B is assumed to be payo¤-dominant. We de…ne a technology's critical mass as the minimum share of users necessary to make the choice of this technology a best response for any remaining user. We show that the technology with a lower critical mass is risk-dominant and is chosen by the maximin criterion. We present experimental evidence that both payo¤ dominance and risk dominance explain participants'choices. The relative riskiness of a technology can be proxied using technologies'critical masses or stand-alone values.JEL-Classi…cation: C72, C91, D81

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confidence: 99%

Technology adoption in markets with network effects: Theory and experimental evidence

Keser

Suleymanova

Wey

2012

Information Economics and Policy

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“…We specify the underlying mechanism formally with respect to merger control. 6 The increasing use of remedies has also triggered empirical research concerning the e¤ectiveness of merger control in general (see Duso et al, 2011, and Duso et al, 2013, for the EU and Clougerthy and Seldeslachts, 2012, for the US).…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Also empirical studies challenge the e¤ectiveness of remedies. Duso et al (2011) and Kwoka and Green…eld (2013) …nd that in comparison with a rigorous denial, remedies may not be well-suited to countervail anticompetitive e¤ects arising from a merger. Davies (2010) tackles the adequacy of remedies especially in case the pre-merger market structure could already give rise to competitive concerns.…”

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Remedies vs. Extreme Options in Merger Control

Dertwinkel-Kalt

Wey

2014

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractWe investigate how remedies in merger control a¤ect information acquisition by an antitrust agency. We identify conditions under which an "extreme options" regime which does not allow for remedies improves information acquisition by the agency which increases consumer surplus. The legislator ("principal") and the agency share the same objective function with the only exception that the latter must bear information costs. When remedies are not feasible, then the agency's incentive to acquire information is relatively large as a false decision tends to have large adverse e¤ects. When remedies are feasible, the intermediate option does not involve such risks, so that incentives to acquire information decreases. However, our results depend crucially on the institutional environment. In the case of an adversial system, information acquisition incentives are not per se lower if remedies are feasible.We thank Lars Sorgard and Deszö Szalay for their helpful comments.

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“…14 The coordination game had an obvious focal point, to ease the establishment of group feelings. 15 We refer to the principal-agents pairs that played the coordination game as CE subjects.…”

Section: Treatment Manipulationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Team building and hidden costs of control

Riener

Wiederhold

2016

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The working papers published in the Series constitute work in progress circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comments. Views expressed represent exclusively the authors' own opinions and do not necessarily reflect those of the editor. Terms of use: Documents inTeam Building and Hidden Costs of Control * Gerhard Riener † and Simon Wiederhold ‡ September 2012Abstract This paper investigates the interaction of intrinsic and extrinsic incentives. We propose a simple principal-agent model with control that incorporates the existence of social groups resulting from common experiences in the past. Our laboratory experiment shows that agents with previous common experiences with their principals (CE agents) perform better than agents without such experiences (NCE agents). However, as soon as actual control exceeds their expectation, CE agents decrease their performance substantially, which has no equivalent for NCE agents. This pronounced decrease in effort when control is perceived as excessive represents a novel channel through which hidden costs of control materialize. Our results have important implications for firms' strategies to motivate employees. JEL code: C92; M54; D03; J22

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How effective is European merger control?

Cited by 97 publications

References 43 publications

Technology adoption in markets with network effects: Theory and experimental evidence

Technology adoption in markets with network effects: Theory and experimental evidence

Remedies vs. Extreme Options in Merger Control

Team building and hidden costs of control

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