Team building and hidden costs of control

Abstract

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The hidden benefits of abstaining from control

“…The paper contributes to the growing experimental economics literature on authority and control in organizations (Falk and Kosfeld, 2006;Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2008; Sliwka, 2007;Ziegelmeyer et al, 2012;Fehr et al, 2013;Charness et al, 2012;Schnedler and Vadovic, 2011;Riener and Wiederhold , 2016). The study also adds to the literature on crowding out (in) effects of incentives on intrinsic motives (see Frey and Jegen, 2000;Bowles and Polanía, 2012).…”

Reactions to (the absence of) control and workplace arrangements: experimental evidence from the internet and the laboratory

“…The results show that the effectiveness of control is comparable in between-group and within-group agency relationships though the mechanisms for how control is perceived are group-specific. Riener and Wiederhold (2016) also test the effect of group norms on the effectiveness of control in FK's principal-agent game (except that the principal's choice set is extended to three control levels). They compare a group-building treatment where subjects initially play a coordination game to gain common experience (CE) with an autarky treatment where subjects complete a task 6 Alternatively, Kessler and Leider (2016) investigate whether the fairness of the process by which control is imposed affects whether or not control will backfire.…”

Pengaruh Pembentukan Tim Dan Kepemimpinan Spiritual Terhadap Motivasi Diri Mahasiswa

“…Membentuk tim (team building) telah diidentifikasi sebagai metode penting untuk meningkatkan iklim psikologis di mana tim beroperasi, serta fungsi tim secara keseluruhan (Beauchamp, dkk., 2017). Pembentukan tim yang baik akan berdampak positif terhadap iklim kerja anggota organisasi (Riener dan Wiederhold, 2016). Membentuk tim dalam organisasi dapat meningkatkan motivasi kerja para anggota (Spinney, 2018;Lester, 2017).…”