How do voters respond to information on self-serving elite behaviour? Evidence from a randomized survey experiment in Tanzania

Abstract

This study is published within the UNU-WIDER project on 'The economics and politics of taxation and social protection'.

Condemning Corruption While Condoning Inefficiency: An Experimental Investigation into Voting Behavior

“…In identifying the secrecy of corruption as the main cause of such phenomenon, the literature has focused its policy recommendations in terms of improved transparency and accountability Finan 2008, 2011;Kolstad and Wiig 2016; but see Escaleras and Lin 2010), stricter enforcement of crimes involving corruption(Fisman and Miguel 2007), better wages and benefits for politicians(Azfar and Nelson 2007), and staff-rotation measures(Abbink 2004). 3 ''The idea that potential politicians differ in their competence is no different from a standard assumption in labor market models that individuals have specific skills so that they will perform better or worse when matched in certain jobs… If competence differs, then an important role of elections is to pick competent politicians and to remove from office those who are demonstrably out of their depth.…”