How Do Firms Implement Impairment Tests of Goodwill?

Petersen, Christian Vriborg; Plenborg, Thomas

doi:10.1111/j.1467-6281.2010.00326.x

Cited by 60 publications

(75 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…On May 21, 219 had opened the questionnaire and of those 191 respondents filled it in. This corresponds to a response rate of 33%, which is satisfactory for questionnaires (Petersen and Plenborg, 2007). Unfortunately, not all executives filled in questionnaire entirely, reducing sample size further.…”

Section: Samplementioning

confidence: 93%

Determinants of executive compensation in privately held firms

Banghøj¹,

Gabrielsen²,

Petersen³

et al. 2010

Accounting & Finance

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We examine what determines executive compensation in privately held firms. Our study is motivated by the fact that most studies in this area rely on data from publicly traded firms. Further, the few studies that are based on data from privately held firms only examine a limited number of determinants of executive compensation. Previous studies also assume that the quality of compensation contracts is identical across executives. Based on unique data from our survey we create a quality index on each executive's bonus plan. We conjecture that the pay to performance relation is stronger for better designed bonus plans.Our findings indicate that the pay to performance relation is weak and insignificant. Board size is the only corporate governance characteristic that explains variations in executive compensation.Executive characteristics like skills, title and educational attainment all explain variations in executive compensation. Contrary to our expectations we do not find a stronger pay to performance relation in firms with better designed bonus plans.

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Section: Samplementioning

confidence: 93%

Determinants of executive compensation in privately held firms

Banghøj¹,

Gabrielsen²,

Petersen³

et al. 2010

Accounting & Finance

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“…On an international level, studies that stand out include those regarding the causes of asset impairment (Francis, Hanna, & Vincent, 1996); evidence of GOODWIMP in financial statements (Hayn & Hughes, 2006); how managers calculate GOODWIMP (Zang, 2008); the way in which companies carry out impairment tests (Petersen & Plenborg, 2010); and whether GOODWIMP losses or reversals in them are used for earnings management (Duh, Lee, & Lin, 2009;Abughazaleh et al, 2011).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Determinants of Goodwill Impairment Loss Recognition

Vogt

Pletsch

Morás

et al. 2016

Rev. contab. finanç.

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This study aimed to verify the determinants of goodwill impairment (GOODWIMP) loss recognition in Brazilian companies. For this, a descriptive and documentary study was carried out in which information was collected from databases and explanatory notes using a quantitative approach. The study sample was comprised of Brazilian companies listed on the Thomson database, totaling 91 companies and 346 observations. Data were collected from 2011 to 2014. For the treatment and analysis of the data, logistic regression with panel data was used. The results show that the factors change in management (CHMAN), book-to-market (BM), number of cash generating units (CGU), variation in return on assets (ΔROA) and goodwill (GOODW) were significant in determining GOODWIMP losses. These findings indicate that in addition to economic factors, managers' actions are associated with the recognition of such losses, which can be characterized as incentives for earnings management (EM) practices. Therefore, it is generally concluded that the GOODWIMP losses recognized in the companies analyzed may not only have been used to reduce their assets to recoverable amounts, but also to achieve results consistent with the objectives of managers.

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“…The importance of providing reliable and compliant disclosure there have been particularly evident for companies applying IAS/IFRS, considering the volatility of performance that is likely to result from the increased use of fair value (Verriest & Gaeremynck, 2009;Petersen & Plenborg, 2010) The research on this topic can be divided in two parts: the first one faces the general quality of the disclosure; the second one is focused and limited to the disclosure on specific items.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…According to previous contributions (Carlin & Finch, 2010;Hartwig, 2012;Devalle & Rizzato, 2012;Petersen & Plenborg, 2010;Teodori & Veneziani, 2010;Biancone, 2012) expect that, in the Italian scenario, there is a lack of compliance both with the requirements of IAS 36 and with Italian public Authorities and Italian Standard Setter. The critical aspects could be related to the quality and precision of the information presented in relation to impairment assumptions and testing procedures.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Impairment of Goodwill: Level of Compliance and Quality of Disclosure during the Crisis-An Analysis of Italian Listed Companies

Izzo

Luciani²,

Sartori

2013

IBR

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This paper investigates the level of disclosure on impairment test of goodwill in the Italian context. The research is based on the analysis of the consolidated financial statements 2007-2011 of companies listed on FTSE MIB of Milan Stock Exchange at 31st December 2012. The main objective of the research is to verify if financial crisis has impacted on the level of compliance with IAS 36 and Guidelines issued by Italian Authorities. In addition, it tests if there are any relations between the level of disclosure and factors such as market capitalization, the ratio Goodwill on Equity and Impairment loss/Goodwill. Our results show that the quality of disclosure is still incomplete, even if it is clear that there is a significant improvement in the period covered by the analysis. In addition, we observe that, at least in relation to our data, there is no relation between the quality of mandatory disclosure on goodwill and the mentioned factors.

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How Do Firms Implement Impairment Tests of Goodwill?

Cited by 60 publications

References 12 publications

Determinants of executive compensation in privately held firms

Determinants of executive compensation in privately held firms

Determinants of Goodwill Impairment Loss Recognition

Impairment of Goodwill: Level of Compliance and Quality of Disclosure during the Crisis-An Analysis of Italian Listed Companies

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