“…Yet detailed micro-level empirical evidence on the factors influencing the ex-post efficiency of insolvency regimes, especially those outside of the United States, is scant (Hotchkiss et al 2008: 38, Blazy et al 2011, 2013: 1937Sundgren 1998, Couwenberg and de Jong 2008, Dewaelheyns and Van Hulle 2009, Leyman et al 2011 Systematic empirical analyses of bankruptcy regimes are especially scarce in the context of postsocialist and emerging-market economies (e.g., Blazy and Stef 2015, Lambert-Mogiliansky et al 2007, Vukelic et al 2014, Knot and Vychodil 2006, even though the design of effective bankruptcy institutions and procedures was identified as a policy priority during transition (see, e.g., Aghion et al 1994, Estrin 2000, Pistor 2000, Csaki 2002) and continues to be an important 1 In contrast, the literature on the ex-ante incentive effects of bankruptcy has been comparatively voluminous (for references, see, e.g., Hotchkiss et al 2008: fn. 1). 3 policy concern in current reform debates worldwide (see, e.g., Cirmizi et al 2012, Claessens et al 2001.…”