How Blackstone Became a Blackstonian

Schorr, David

doi:10.2202/1565-3404.1210

Cited by 14 publications

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“…The notion of property as a type of sovereignty was an exaggeration, as Blackstone himself seems to have been aware (Burns 1985;Rose 1998, p. 604;Schorr 2009). Regulation, taxation, and liability for uses of property that harm others always constrained the discretion of property owners.…”

Section: S81mentioning

confidence: 99%

Making Coasean Property More Coasean

Merrill

Smith

2011

The Journal of Law and Economics

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In his pioneering work on transaction costs, Ronald Coase presupposed a picture of property as a bundle of government-prescribed use rights. Not only is this picture not essential to Coase's purpose, but its limitations emerge when we apply Coase's central insights to analyze the structure of property itself. This leads to the Coase corollary: in a world of zero transaction costs, the nature of property does not matter to allocative efficiency. However, as with the Coase theorem, the real implication is for our world of positive transaction costs: we need to subject the notion of property to a comparative institutional analysis. Because transaction costs are positive, property is initially defined in terms of things, uses are grouped under exclusion rights, and in rem rights are widely employed. A more thoroughly Coasean approach points back to a picture of property more like the traditional one furnished by the law. The authors thank Benito Arruñada, Yun-chien Chang, Bob Ellickson, Tom Hazlett, and an anonymous reviewer as well as participants at the conference Markets, Firms, and Property Rights: A

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Section: S81mentioning

confidence: 99%

Making Coasean Property More Coasean

Merrill

Smith

2011

The Journal of Law and Economics

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“…Ownership is typically exercised (after Blackstone 2001 [1765]; see Schorr 2009) through the owner’s power to exclude use (Bell and Parchomovsky 2007; Ellickson 1993). When the use of land is governed through simple ownership, all legally allowable decisions about who may use the land to what end are left to the owner’s discretion.…”

Section: Tenure In Us Urban Scholarship: Orthodoxy and Critical Appromentioning

confidence: 99%

Reinvigorating the Concept of Land Tenure for American Urban Geography

Pierce

2010

Geography Compass

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Tenure rights are durable privileges to use and benefit from specific pieces of land. In the USA, tenure rights are typically conceptually folded into the ‘bundle of rights’ associated with formal land ownership. Legally, this model rests on well‐documented principles: private, serial, single‐party property ownership and clear, well‐regulated surveying. However, tenure does not begin and end in property. People negotiate the terms under which they use spaces – and the durability of those terms – through implicit and explicit social processes. Many geographers focused on US cities have tacitly conceded that existing forms of tenure are adequately captured in the concept of property rights despite extensive discussion about the complex construction of non‐property rights in the development literature. This article argues that a vocabulary adapted from the conversation about land tenure, specifically regarding use and usufruct rights, would enhance the ‘critical property’ literature by exposing additional, already‐existing rights in land.

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“…It never existed historically, and Blackstone himself chronicled many limitations on property rights, contrary to the absolutist understanding of property associated with his name (Rose 1988;Schroeder 1994, pp. 289-291, 283-284, 299;Schorr 2009). More important for present purposes, the new essentialism is not a modern instantiation of the fictional Blackstonian picture of property, notwithstanding the superficial similarities.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…Blackstone (1769, p. *1); Merrill (1998, p. 736);Dagan (2011, p. 37);Alexander (2012Alexander ( , pp. 1858) (citing Rose 1988 andSchorr 2009). ) Almost a decade before Penner and Merrill's pioneering works launching the new essentialism, Singer (1988) critiqued the idea that property provides owners with a broad core of authority; he associated the idea with the "classical period in American legal thought" from "the end of the Civil War to World War II" (pp.…”

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confidence: 99%

The New Essentialism in Property

Wyman¹

2017

Journal of Legal Analysis

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Is property a flexible bundle of rights or a stable legal category? Since the late 1990s, prominent scholars have rejected the conventional wisdom that the bundle metaphor defines property. These "new essentialists" have sought to reclaim property as a distinct legal category with a definable core. Their academic project is now highly salient because the American Law Institute is engaged in a project of restating property law, directed by a leading new essentialist. This article takes stock of the new essentialists' efforts to offer a new understanding of property. It distills the core elements of the new essentialist definition of property. Most importantly, it argues that this definition is highly malleable and not as distinct from the bundle picture as the new essentialists and their critics suppose. . I N T R O D U C T I O N

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How Blackstone Became a Blackstonian

Cited by 14 publications

References 0 publications

Making Coasean Property More Coasean

Making Coasean Property More Coasean

Reinvigorating the Concept of Land Tenure for American Urban Geography

The New Essentialism in Property

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