Recent law and economics scholarship has revived a debate on bright-line rules in property theory. Economic analysis asserts a baseline preference for bright-line property rules because of the information costs if "all the world" had to understand a range of permitted uses, or deal with multiple interest holders in a resource. A baseline preference for bright-line rules of property arises from the cost of communicating information: all else being equal, complex rules suit smaller audiences (e.g., contracting parties) and simple rules suit large audiences (e.g., property transactors, violators, and enforcers). This article explores the circumstances in which a simple rule, purportedly for a large audience, takes on interpretive complexity as it traverses specialized audience segments. The argument draws on two heuristic strands of recent sociolegal scholarship: systems theory notions of autopoiesis, and concepts of negotiability in plural property relations. The potential for complex interpretations of simple legal rules is illustrated through a case study of the Fataluku language group in the district of Lautem, East Timor.Recent law and economics scholarship has revived a debate on bright-line rules of exclusion in property theory. Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith (2011) argue that exclusion better defines the core element of property than the metaphor of a "bundle of rights." 1 Their argument is based on a conception of property as an act of communication: unlike rights in contract, property rights are good "against the world," and require rules that reduce the costs of information for a broad class of potential violators orThe authors wish to thank Henry Smith, Susana Barnes, Rebecca Monson, and two anonymous reviewers for their insights and comments. The authors owe a considerable debt of gratitude to the people of Lautem and to members of East Timor's Land and Property Unit.