Split manufacturing (SM) seeks to protect against piracy of intellectual property (IP) in chip designs. Here we propose a scheme to manipulate both placement and routing in an intertwined manner, thereby increasing the resilience of SM layouts. Key stages of our scheme are to (partially) randomize a design, place and route the erroneous netlist, and restore the original design by re-routing the BEOL. Based on state-of-the-art proximity attacks, we demonstrate that our scheme notably excels over the prior art (i.e., 0% correct connection rates). Our scheme induces controllable PPA overheads and lowers commercial cost (the latter by splitting at higher layers).Wang et al. [5] proposed an advanced proximity attack which utilizes multiple hints from the FEOL layouts: (i) physical proximity of gates, (ii) avoidance of combinatorial loops, (iii) constraints on load capacitances, (iv) direction of "dangling wires" 1 , and (v) timing constraints. Magaña et al. [6,7] proposed different attack schemes, whereupon they empirically observe that attacks considering routing paths/utilization are more effective than placement-centric attacks. They also observe that the IBM superblue suite is considerably more challenging to attack than "traditional," small-scale benchmarks. Note that their attacks do not recover actual netlists, but only list possible candidates for each net to reconnect.Key attack metrics, as discussed in [3,5,12], are the Hamming distance (HD), the correct connection rate (CCR), and the output error rate (OER). The HD quantifies the mismatch between the outputs of an original and the outputs of a recovered/stolen netlist during test stimulation. An HD of 0% (or 100%) denotes attack success. The 1 There are metal segments left open/unconnected in the topmost FEOL layer, namely where the vias connecting upward to the BEOL are to be placed. These metal segments are referred to as "dangling wires. " Moreover, we refer to the locations for those vias connecting with the BEOL as virtual pins (vpins), as in [6,7].