Homogeneity and Democracy in Austrian Federalism: The Constitutional Court's Ruling on Direct Democracy in Vorarlberg

Gamper, Anna

doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.pubjof.a004977

Cited by 5 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…In this ruling, the ACC declared an article of the regional constitution of Vorarlberg void for breach of the federal principle of constitutional homogeneity. The constitution of Vorarlberg would have authorized its population to demand the enactment, amendment or abolition of a regional law by way of a citizen's petition (Gamper 2003). If supported by a fifth of the electorate, the regional legislature would be forced to call a binding referendum on the issue.…”

Section: The Austrian Constitutional Court: a Weak Counterforce Againmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Therefore, the court concluded that 'the repressing of the referendum in general does not merely form a federal constitutional standard that binds the federation, but [is] a fundamental constitutional principle of representative democracy that binds the state constitutions as well' (Court judgment, cited in [and translated by] Gamper 2003: 51; my italics). In this way, the judges constrained the constitutional autonomy of the regions beyond what is required from the federal constitution (Gamper 2003).…”

Section: The Austrian Constitutional Court: a Weak Counterforce Againmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Federalism and Regionalism in Western Europe

Swenden

2006

117

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication 4 The Centre and the Regions: the Political Economy Approach 1. Introduction 2. Competence assignment in a federal state: an overview of three theories 3. Competence assignment in Western Europe: testing the three theories 4. The scope of federalism: expenditure and tax (de-)centralization 5. Vertical fiscal imbalances and why they arise 6. Vertical and horizontal fiscal imbalances and how they can be reduced 7. Regional spending, tax autonomy and equalization: an overview 8. ConclusionTables 1.1 Standard characteristics of a federation applied to six West European States 2.1 Overview of German regions (Länder) 2.2 Overview of the Spanish regions (Autonomous Communities) and their constitutional route to regional autonomy 2.3 The regions of the United Kingdom and their constitutional status 2.4 Contemporary Austria and its regions 2.5 The Belgian Regions and Communities 2.6 Switzerland and its regions 3.1 The Spanish regions and differences in constitutional status 3.2 Summary of distribution of legislative and administrative competencies and methods for changing that distribution 4.1 Distribution of competencies in Western Europe's multilayered setting 4.2 Public expenditure distribution in a multilayered setting 109 4.3 Typology of tax regimes (on the basis of four indicators) 110 4.4 Public revenue distribution in a multilayered setting 112 4.5 Regional tax revenues and vertical fiscal imbalances 113 4.6 Different tax sources and their corresponding tax type 121 5.1 General election results for state-wide parties and their regional breakdown 5.2 Ethno-regionalist parties and their electoral performance in the most recent general (and regional) elections 149 6.1 Patterns of IGR and their effects on policy change in six West European states 6.2 Composition and powers (with regard to ordinary legislation) of six federal/central second chambers 194 7.1 Citizens of the Spanish historic communities and their knowledge of the regional language 7.2 National identification in the Basque Country and Catalonia, 1979-2002 7.3 National identification in Belgium and the UK 277

show abstract

Section: The Austrian Constitutional Court: a Weak Counterforce Againmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Austrian Constitutional Court: a Weak Counterforce Againmentioning

confidence: 99%

Federalism and Regionalism in Western Europe

Swenden

2006

117

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…In Belgium, on the other hand, the Constitutional Court has only played a marginal role in adjudicating disputes between the Communities, Regions and the federal center, though that role has somewhat expanded since the 2004 regional elections as the federal and Community/Regional governments are no longer composed of the same parties (ALEN AND MUYLLE, 2008;ERK, 2011). Finally, in Austria the Constitutional Court has not served to curb the centralized character of the Austrian federation (GAMPER, 2003).…”

Section: The Constitutional Court and Judicial Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Autocracy-Sustaining Versus Democratic Federalism: Explaining the Divergent Trajectories of Territorial Politics in Russia and Western Europe

Obydenkova

Swenden

2013

Territory, Politics, Governance

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article provides a comparative assessment of territorial politics in Russia and Western Europe. The consolidation or deepening of regional autonomy in Western Europe contrasts with the transformation of Russia from a segmented and highly centrifugal state into a centralized authoritarian state in the course of just two decades. The consolidation of territorial politics in Western Europe is linked to the presence of endogenous safeguards that are built into their territorial constitutional designs and most importantly to the dynamics that emanate from multi-level party competition in the context of a liberal and multi-level democracy. In contrast, in Russia, neither endogenous safeguards nor multi-level party democracy play an important role in explaining the dynamics of Russian federalism, but who controls key state resources instead. We argue that under Putin power dependencies between the Russian center and the regions are strongest where regional democracy is at its weakest, thus producing 'autocracy-sustaining' instead of a democratic federation. By studying the relationship between federalism and democracy in cases where both concepts are mutually reinforcing (as in Western Europe) with the critical case of Russia where they are not, we question the widely held view that democracy is a necessary pre-condition for federalism.EXTRACTO En este artículo ofrecemos una valoración comparativa de la política territorial en Rusia y Europa occidental. La consolidación o profundización de la autonomía regional en Europa occidental contrasta con la transformación de Rusia que en tan solo dos decenios ha pasado de ser un Estado segmentado y sumamente centrífugo a un Estado autoritario y centralizado. La consolidación de la política territorial en Europa occidental está vinculada a la presencia de protecciones endógenas que se incorporan en sus diseños constitucionales territoriales, y, lo que es más importante, en las dinámicas que emanan de la competencia de partidos de varios niveles en el contexto de una democracia liberal y de muchos niveles. Por el contrario, en Rusia ni las protecciones endógenas ni una democracia de partidos de varios niveles desempeñan un papel importante a la hora de explicar las dinámicas del federalismo de Rusia, sino más bien la cuestión de quién controla los principales recursos estatales . Sostenemos que bajo Putin las dependencias de poder entre el centro de Rusia y sus regiones son más fuertes donde la democracia regional es más débil, creándose así una federación que 'respalda la autocracia' en vez de una federación democrática. Al estudiar la relación entre el federalismo y la democracia en los casos en los que ambos conceptos se refuerzan mutuamente (como en Europa occidental), con el caso crítico de Rusia donde esto no ocurre, cuestionamos la opinión mayoritaria de que la democracia es una precondición necesaria para el federalismo.

show abstract

“…Austria's weak federalism is characterized by largely symmetrical, less competitive relations between the Länder (Gamper 2003). In both countries, a wide variety of intergovernmental connections 3 organize federal vertical and horizontal interaction.…”

Section: Germany and Austria: Outlines Of Strong And Weak Cooperativementioning

confidence: 99%

Does Federalism Impact Gender Architectures? The Case of Women's Policy Agencies in Germany and Austria

Lang

Sauer

2012

Publius: The Journal of Federalism

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article investigates how strong German and weak Austrian cooperative federalism affect women's policy machineries. We find that it is the federal organization of both polities that has posited engrained advantages for the establishment and the sustainability of women's policy agencies (WPA). We also find that center/left parties are crucial for sustaining and advancing the role of WPA. However, during economic crises, we see that the women's policy infrastructure in the strong federal state (Germany) was downsized while Austria's national social democratic WPA protects subnational institutions. Germany and Austria have long been considered conservative and malebreadwinner welfare states (Ostner and Lewis 1995; Michel and Mahon 2002). Throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, both were laggards in Western Europe in promoting labor market participation by women, reproducing a typical male breadwinner family and a stay-at-home or part-time employed mother. Therefore, the fact that both countries have substantial women's policy infrastructures seems counterintuitive. Women's policy agencies (WPA), defined as ''any structure established by government with its main purpose being the betterment of women's social status'' (McBride Stetson and Mazur 1995, 3) developed from the local to the national level, in effect utilizing the ''politics of scale'' to promote gender policy innovation (i.e., Guenther 2006; Mahon 2006; MacRae 2010). By all accounts, Germany has the most developed network of WPA in Europe, with more than 1,900 equality offices on the local level alone (BMFSFJ 2008) and additional WPA units on the Länder and the federal level. Austria's WPA structure, while somewhat less ubiquitous, also features a stable network of equality-oriented agencies that has gained steady influence, with gender budgeting constitutionally required on all by 2013. Thus, while in both countries women remained socially and economically disadvantaged for much of the twentieth century, demands to institutionalize a gender equality infrastructure resulted in

show abstract

Homogeneity and Democracy in Austrian Federalism: The Constitutional Court's Ruling on Direct Democracy in Vorarlberg

Cited by 5 publications

References 0 publications

Federalism and Regionalism in Western Europe

Federalism and Regionalism in Western Europe

Autocracy-Sustaining Versus Democratic Federalism: Explaining the Divergent Trajectories of Territorial Politics in Russia and Western Europe

Does Federalism Impact Gender Architectures? The Case of Women's Policy Agencies in Germany and Austria

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About