Autocracy-Sustaining Versus Democratic Federalism: Explaining the Divergent Trajectories of Territorial Politics in Russia and Western Europe

Abstract

This article provides a comparative assessment of territorial politics in Russia and Western Europe. The consolidation or deepening of regional autonomy in Western Europe contrasts with the transformation of Russia from a segmented and highly centrifugal state into a centralized authoritarian state in the course of just two decades. The consolidation of territorial politics in Western Europe is linked to the presence of endogenous safeguards that are built into their territorial constitutional designs and most importantly to the dynamics that emanate from multi-level party competition in the context of a liberal and multi-level democracy. In contrast, in Russia, neither endogenous safeguards nor multi-level party democracy play an important role in explaining the dynamics of Russian federalism, but who controls key state resources instead. We argue that under Putin power dependencies between the Russian center and the regions are strongest where regional democracy is at its weakest, thus producing 'autocracy-sustaining' instead of a democratic federation. By studying the relationship between federalism and democracy in cases where both concepts are mutually reinforcing (as in Western Europe) with the critical case of Russia where they are not, we question the widely held view that democracy is a necessary pre-condition for federalism.EXTRACTO En este artículo ofrecemos una valoración comparativa de la política territorial en Rusia y Europa occidental. La consolidación o profundización de la autonomía regional en Europa occidental contrasta con la transformación de Rusia que en tan solo dos decenios ha pasado de ser un Estado segmentado y sumamente centrífugo a un Estado autoritario y centralizado. La consolidación de la política territorial en Europa occidental está vinculada a la presencia de protecciones endógenas que se incorporan en sus diseños constitucionales territoriales, y, lo que es más importante, en las dinámicas que emanan de la competencia de partidos de varios niveles en el contexto de una democracia liberal y de muchos niveles. Por el contrario, en Rusia ni las protecciones endógenas ni una democracia de partidos de varios niveles desempeñan un papel importante a la hora de explicar las dinámicas del federalismo de Rusia, sino más bien la cuestión de quién controla los principales recursos estatales . Sostenemos que bajo Putin las dependencias de poder entre el centro de Rusia y sus regiones son más fuertes donde la democracia regional es más débil, creándose así una federación que 'respalda la autocracia' en vez de una federación democrática. Al estudiar la relación entre el federalismo y la democracia en los casos en los que ambos conceptos se refuerzan mutuamente (como en Europa occidental), con el caso crítico de Rusia donde esto no ocurre, cuestionamos la opinión mayoritaria de que la democracia es una precondición necesaria para el federalismo.

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