Holding Them Responsible

Sheehy, Paul

doi:10.1111/j.1475-4975.2006.00129.x

Cited by 6 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…This account of intergenerational moral sentiment is consistent with some analyses of the collective responsibility of social groups. It is, for example, consistent with Paul Sheehy's view that the kinds of social group that can be responsible for what they do are those that have “a capacity for collective reflection and deliberation” (Sheehy 2006, 77–78). Indeed, it may be seen as one interpretation of how a social group possesses that capacity.…”

supporting

confidence: 65%

The Moral Legacy of Communal Wrongs: Ethnic Identity Groups and Intergenerational Moral Sentiment

Kovach¹

2010

Metaphilosophy

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Many individuals experience feelings of collective guilt or shame for the blameworthy historical acts of the nations or ethnic groups to which they belong. I reject the idea that collective moral sentiment rests on inherited moral responsibility. I suggest that the possibilities for individual action inherent in membership in ethnic identity groups can be a source of special moral duties. I argue that collective guilt and shame are moral emotions that individuals experience in response to complex assessments of their groups' histories and of their own practical responses to those histories. The approach I take to analyzing the concept of an ethnic identity group makes use of tools developed by Max Weber. Weber's conceptual work on social groups and related phenomena has been strongly criticized in a widely discussed book by Margaret Gilbert. I show that Gilbert's arguments fail to discredit Weberian analyses of social groups and their properties.Communal wrongs are moral wrongs that are committed by one collectivity against another. Many individuals experience feelings of collective guilt or shame for the blameworthy historical acts of the nations or ethnic groups to which they belong (Branscombe and Doosje 2004;Barkan 2000). Not infrequently-perhaps typically-these moral emotions seem to fit the circumstances in which they are experienced. When members of a historical perpetrator group feel no moral discomfort connected to the serious wrongs of their group-particularly when those wrongs have not yet been rightedwe might see personal moral failure in their disengagement from the group's history. A theory of intergenerational moral sentiment is an attempt to explain why grave moral wrongs committed by a collectivity at one point in time leave a mark on the moral lives of members of that collectivity who live at a later time and who can have had no part in the commission of those wrongs. It is a normative theory of the phenomena of intergenerational feelings of moral guilt and shame.Most theories of intergenerational sentiment rest on the idea that subsequent generations of perpetrator groups are morally compromised r

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supporting

confidence: 65%

The Moral Legacy of Communal Wrongs: Ethnic Identity Groups and Intergenerational Moral Sentiment

Kovach¹

2010

Metaphilosophy

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“…However, to reassess these phenomena within ExE research would yield very interesting new results. Paradigm examples may include analyses of collective grief, for example, in the wake of natural catastrophes, terrorism, or other national traumata (Curci & Luminet, ), and collective pride or self‐esteem, such as patriotism, jubilatory emotions in the context of national sports events (Ehrenreich, ; Harth, Kessler, & Leach, ; Gilbert, ; Nussbaum, ; Sullivan, , ), and collective guilt or shame concerning genocide (Gilbert, , , ; Sheehy, ; Harth et al, ).…”

Section: Dimension Of Exementioning

confidence: 99%

Extended emotions

Krueger

Szanto

2016

Philosophy Compass

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Until recently, philosophers and psychologists conceived of emotions as brain‐ and body‐bound affairs. But researchers have started to challenge this internalist and individualist orthodoxy. A rapidly growing body of work suggests that some emotions incorporate external resources and thus extend beyond the neurophysiological confines of organisms; some even argue that emotions can be socially extended and shared by multiple agents. Call this the extended emotions thesis (ExE). In this article, we consider different ways of understanding ExE in philosophy, psychology, and the cognitive sciences. First, we outline the background of the debate and discuss different argumentative strategies for ExE. In particular, we distinguish ExE from cognate but more moderate claims about the embodied and situated nature of cognition and emotion (Section 1). We then dwell upon two dimensions of ExE: emotions extended by material culture and by the social factors (Section 2). We conclude by defending ExE against some objections (Section 3) and point to desiderata for future research (Section 4).

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“…French's critics resisted the conclusion (Werhane, Persons 38; Donaldson, ‘Moral Agency’ 58; Keely 149; Velasquez, ‘Why Corporations’ 8; Sheehy 77). The problem lay in the notion of an intention as a belief/desire complex, which made sense only within the context of a single mind (Velasquez, ‘Debunking’).…”

Section: Capacities‐based Accounts Of Cmrmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate Moral Responsibility

Sepinwall

2016

Philosophy Compass

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This essay provides a critical overview of the debate about corporate moral responsibility (CMR). Parties to the debate address whether corporations are the kinds of entities that can be blamed when they cause unjustified harm. Proponents of CMR argue that corporations satisfy the conditions for moral agency and so they are fit for blame. Their opponents respond that corporations lack one or more of the capacities necessary for moral agency. I review the arguments on both sides and conclude ultimately that what divides the two is not so much competing conceptions of the corporation as it is disagreement about what moral agency requires. Homing in on the real site of contention will, it is hoped, allow future participants in the debate to focus their efforts more productively.

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Holding Them Responsible

Cited by 6 publications

References 14 publications

The Moral Legacy of Communal Wrongs: Ethnic Identity Groups and Intergenerational Moral Sentiment

The Moral Legacy of Communal Wrongs: Ethnic Identity Groups and Intergenerational Moral Sentiment

Extended emotions

Corporate Moral Responsibility

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