Corporate Moral Responsibility

Sepinwall, Amy J.

doi:10.1111/phc3.12293

Cited by 14 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 75 publications

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“…Another intriguing topic concerns how individuals process the actions of corporations and relates to the longstanding business ethics discussion of corporations as moral agents (see, for example, French, 1979;Velasquez, 1983;and Sepinwall, 2015). Cognitive neuroscience has examined brain activity as individuals blame other individuals, but there is little research looking at the question of brain activity as people blame an entity such as a corporation.…”

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confidence: 99%

Business Ethics: The Promise of Neuroscience

2016

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Recent advances in cognitive neuroscience research portend well for furthering understanding of many of the fundamental questions in the field of business ethics, both normative and empirical. This article provides an overview of neuroscience methodology and brain structures, and explores the areas in which neuroscience research has contributed findings of value to business ethics, as well as suggesting areas for future research. Neuroscience research is especially capable of providing insight into individual reactions to ethical issues, while also raising challenging normative questions about the nature of moral responsibility, autonomy, intent, and free will. This article also provides a brief summary of the papers included in this special issue, attesting to the richness of scholarly inquiry linking neuroscience and business ethics. We conclude that neuroscience offers considerable promise to the field of business ethics, but we caution against overpromise.

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Section: )mentioning

confidence: 99%

Business Ethics: The Promise of Neuroscience

2016

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“…Exactly how these institutions can be held responsible is a difficult question, of course. There is considerable debate in the literature over whether there are legitimate ascriptions of ‘corporate responsibility’ (Sverdlik, 1987; Sepinwall, 2016), or whether all such ascriptions are reducible to conjunctions about claims about individuals (Giubilini and Levy, 2018). However that debate is settled, responsibility surely attaches to many individuals: to policy makers, legislators, highly placed businesspeople and perhaps ordinary people (especially higher SES individuals) in their capacity as voters.…”

Section: Taking Responsibility For Responsibilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Taking Responsibility for Responsibility

Levy

2019

Public Health Ethics

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Governments, physicians, media and academics have all called for individuals to bear responsibility for their own health. In this article, I argue that requiring those with adverse health outcomes to bear responsibility for these outcomes is a bad basis for policy. The available evidence strongly suggests that the capacities for responsible choice, and the circumstances in which these capacities are exercised, are distributed alongside the kinds of goods we usually talk about in discussing distributive justice, and this distribution significantly explains why people make bad health choices. These facts suggest that we cannot justifiably hold them responsible for these choices. We do better to hold responsible those who determine the ways in which capacities and circumstances are distributed: they are indirectly responsible for these adverse health outcomes and possess the capacities and resources to take responsibility for these facts.

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“…The group is rather an individual entity with its own intentions and performing its own actions, which warrants attribution of only an individual type of responsibility. In fact, in order to stress the fact that the group agent bears moral responsibility in a way that is independent from the composite nature of the group, the notion of “corporate responsibility” (French ; Sverdlik ; Pettit ; List and Pettit , 167–169; Sepinwall ), rather than that of “collective responsibility”, is often adopted to refer to the responsibility of organized groups. In fact, because corporate responsibility is independent of attribution of responsibility to individual members of the group, some do not consider it an instance of collective responsibility at all (List and Pettit , 167–169; Sverdlik ): in contrast to what occurs in cases of collective responsibility, “with corporate responsibility the group is treated as a being distinct from its members and responsibility for wrongdoing is attributed to it” (Sverdlik , 62).…”

Section: Types Of Collective Moral Responsibilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Responsibility Of Organized Groupsmentioning

confidence: 99%

What in the World Is Collective Responsibility?

Giubilini

Levy

2018

Dialectica

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In this paper we analyse the notion of collective responsibility and the criteria for its application to different types of groups. We argue that most of the ways in which the notion of collective responsibility has been attributed to different types of groups actually refer to a form of responsibility that is not genuinely collective, but that boils down to some form of individual responsibility. We identify an intrinsically collective kind of responsibility and argue that it can be attributed to only one kind of group. We begin by setting two necessary and sufficient conditions for attribution of genuinely collective moral responsibility, asking whether these two conditions are satisfied in the case of different types of groups that have been taken to be bearers of moral responsibility: organized groups, groups with internal bonds of solidarity, groups that program individuals to act in a certain way, random collections of individuals, and individuals engaging in joint actions. Contrary to what various authors have maintained, we argue that only in the case of individuals engaging in joint actions is attribution of a genuinely collective form of moral responsibility warranted, i.e. only groups engaging in joint action satisfy the two conditions for attribution of genuinely collective moral responsibility.

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Corporate Moral Responsibility

Cited by 14 publications

References 75 publications

Business Ethics: The Promise of Neuroscience

Business Ethics: The Promise of Neuroscience

Taking Responsibility for Responsibility

What in the World Is Collective Responsibility?

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